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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Please do not quote from, cite or reproduce this report without the research team’s prior 
written permission. 
 
This interim report on legal barriers to doing business in ASEAN coincides with the 
50th Anniversary of ASEAN’s founding and the first year of the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC). The team is privileged to be supported by, among others, the 
Canada-ASEAN Business Council (CABC), given that it is also the 40th anniversary of 
dialogue relations between Canada and ASEAN. 
 
Despite occasional misgivings about the “ASEAN Way”, ASEAN economic integration 
has come a very long way. The number of member States has grown over the 50 
years since ASEAN’s founding, and the joint efforts among these States driving 
economic growth and integration in the region have been notable.1  Laws have 
changed, new institutions and processes have sprung up. Guided by blueprints and 
action plans, ASEAN is moving increasingly towards being a rules-based economic 
group.  
 
As global uncertainties continue to grow, ASEAN has an important role in unlocking 
more economic opportunities for its businesses and its citizens. One area where this 
objective can be advanced is through addressing legal barriers which contribute to 
business costs in ASEAN. 
 
This study, due to be fully completed in the second quarter of 2018, examines business 
concerns through a legal lens, to identify key legal barriers to trade and investment in 
ASEAN. Research is being carried out in four main areas:  
 Corporate laws; 
 Trade and investment laws; 
 Land Laws; and 
 Dispute settlement laws and processes. 
 
This interim report records a number of key common themes which have surfaced, 
including the complexity and number of laws, uncertainty of laws, implementation of 
existing laws and regional agreements and access to legal information. Such issues 
can contribute to increased business costs and possibly deter or delay business 
activity. The aim is for the recommendations in this report to be considered by policy-
makers to further improve the business laws and processes in ASEAN. 
 
The team’s key interim findings and preliminary recommendations are found in 
Section 6 of this Interim Report. 
  
                                                            
1   According to the Global Enabling Trade Report 2016, ASEAN is now “more accessible” for 
trading goods than Europe and the US: see http://reports.weforum.org/global-enabling-trade-
report-2016/press-releases/. The Report uses the Enabling Trade Index, and assesses the 
performance of 136 economies on “domestic and foreign market access; border administration; 
transport and digital infrastructure; transport services; and operating environment”. 
 
 
 
This interim report describes research in progress by the authors and is made available to 
elicit comments, discussions and debate. The authors hope that their recommendations will 
be useful to policy-makers and businesses in ASEAN. The authors request that readers do 
not quote from, cite or reproduce this interim report without their prior written permission. 
 
The authors would like to acknowledge the support for their research from the Singapore 
Ministry of Education (MOE) Academic Research Fund (AcRF) Tier 1 grant (Grant Number: 
15-C234-SMU-001). 
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SECTION 1 OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH PROJECT AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Objectives in relation to ASEAN Integration 
 
The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in December 2015 and 
the celebration of the 50th anniversary of ASEAN’s founding in 2017 provided 
compelling reasons to embark on this research project in 2016. As the AEC moves 
forward with trade-friendly objectives such as trade facilitation and harmonisation of 
rules, the project seeks to complement these objectives by examining key legal 
barriers faced by businesses which trade and invest in ASEAN countries. The study’s 
recommendations are aimed at providing useful new insights to ASEAN policy-
makers, to help them further improve business-related laws and policies for the 
business community.  
 
The AEC Blueprint 2007 set out four main goals: (1) creating a single market and 
production base with a free flow of goods, services and skilled labour and a freer flow 
of capital; (2) developing a competitive region with clear competition policies; (3) 
promoting equitable economic development; and (4) developing a region integrated 
into global networks.2 Updating and building on the above, the AEC Blueprint 2025 
sets out the following aims: (i) A Highly Integrated and Cohesive Economy; (ii) A 
Competitive, Innovative, and Dynamic ASEAN; (iii) Enhanced Connectivity and 
Sectoral Cooperation; (iv) A Resilient, Inclusive, People-Oriented, and People-
Centred ASEAN; and (v) A Global ASEAN.3 
 
The success of a single market and production base is however dependent on strong 
connectivity – including legal connectivity – in ASEAN. The legal systems of the 
member States are diverse, have developed along different lines and are shaped by 
different political forces. The aspiration of a single market must therefore be 
accompanied by a consideration of the legal and regulatory frameworks in the region 
and how they may best support the aims of the AEC. Addressing key legal barriers 
can therefore play an important role in reducing business costs and encouraging more 
trade. 
 
Laws and their application are seen to be important factors in helping to reduce 
transaction costs for businesses in ASEAN, as the following list illustrates: 
 Stability of government policies; 
 Consistency of laws and regulations; 
 Consistency of judicial decisions; and 
 Addressing corruption and the additional costs it imposes on investors.4 
 
                                                            
2  ASEAN Economic Blueprint 2007; asean.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-10.pdf 
(accessed on 23 July 2017). 
3  astnet.asean.org/docs/AEC-Blueprint-2025-FINAL.pdf (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
4  Feedback from a business participant at a Roundtable discussion held as part of the team’s 
research. The participant also shared that very often, it is what is not written in the law or 
regulations that may be more serious barriers. 
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The regulatory framework that governs businesses in a 
country is an integral part of the country’s business or 
investment climate. Studies have generally shown a 
correlation between regulation on the one hand, and 
entrepreneurship and investment on the other. A 
reduction in the costs of setting up businesses has been 
linked with a general increase in the creation of new 
businesses5 and foreign investments.6  
 
There is already much other work done in this area.7 
Other studies have raised the matter of transaction 
costs to businesses resulting from factors such as legal 
barriers, diverse legal rules, slow implementation of 
legal obligations, or a lack of clear laws.8 As the side-
bar indicates, some of these concerns apply in the wider 
Asia-Pacific context, and not just within ASEAN. 
 
The present study builds on such work, taking a legal 
perspective to identify key legal barriers, to provide a 
number of preliminary recommendations.9   
 
                                                            
5  Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “The 
Regulation of Entry”, (2002) 117 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1-37; Alberto Alesina, 
Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti & Fabio Schiantarelli, “Regulation and Investment”, (2005) 
3 Journal of the European Economic Association  791–825; Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven & 
Raghuram Rajan, “Entry Regulation as a Barrier to Entrepreneurship”, (2006) 82 Journal of 
Financial Economics, 591–629; Miriam Bruhn, “License to Sell: the Effect of Business 
Registration Reform on Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico”, (2011) 93 The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 382–386; Raian Divanbeigi & Rita Ramalho, “Business Regulations and 
Growth”, Policy Research Working Paper, No. WPS 7299 (2015). Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/694641468188652385/Business-
regulations-and-growth (accessed on 22 July 2017). 
6  Jonathan Munemo, “Business Start-up Regulations and the Complementarity between Foreign 
and Domestic Investment” (2014) 150 Rev World Econ, 745–761; Adrian Corcoran & Rob ert 
Gillanders, “Foreign Direct Investment and the Ease of Doing Business”, (2015) 151 Rev World 
Econ 103–126. 
7  These include starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, 
registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across 
borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency; see World Bank, at: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2017 (accessed on 20 
July 2017). In particular, the World Bank has created an ‘ease of doing business’ index, based 
on a number of sub-indices, which is used to rank 190 economies worldwide. The findings are 
published in annual reports, the most recent of which is, Doing Business 2017: Equal 
Opportunity for All, current as of June 1, 2016. Doing Business is based on laws and regulations 
that affect the business environment, and relies on local experts, including lawyers, business 
consultants, accountants, government officials and other professionals who routinely 
administer or advise on legal and regulatory requirements, for much of the data. Countries 
generally wish to improve their rankings in the World Bank Rankings. 
8  See for example, the indicators of trade and investment barriers at World Bank, 
http://tcdata360.worldbank.org/topics (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
9  This research is supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education (MOE) Academic Research 
Fund (AcRF) Tier 1 grant (Grant Number: 15-C234-SMU-001). 
 
The following shows the top 
law-related areas of 
considerations to the 
question posed to APEC 
CEOs: “What matters most 
in your business decisions 
to invest in APEC 
economies outside of your 
principal APEC economy?”  
 
 
 
No. 1:  55% - Regulatory 
environment (transparent 
rules, lack of corruption) 
No. 4: 43% - Land rights 
and contracts protection  
 
APEC CEO SURVEY 
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Methodology 
 
The study draws on a number of sources of research materials, including the following: 
- An online survey of businesses operating in the ASEAN region, conducted by 
the research team;10 
- Existing literature and research materials; 
- Survey materials of regional and international organisations; 
- Feedback received during Roundtable discussions held by the team in a 
number of ASEAN cities; 
- Economic and regional commentaries. 
 
The findings and recommendations in this interim report are preliminary in that there 
is further work to be done to confirm the findings, refine the preliminary 
recommendations and to address related issues arising from the research material. 
 
Identification of Key Legal Barriers 
 
This study examines primarily legal barriers, namely, barriers which arise because of 
legal restrictions in laws and regulations, legal ambiguities, burdensome legal 
requirements, or a lack of laws or clear procedures. While it will mention non-legal 
obstacles where relevant, these are not the focus. Other barriers - such as time and 
cost barriers - are measures in other extensive studies.11 
 
The study examines legal barriers in four major areas: 
 Corporate and “doing business” barriers such as registration, compliance and 
related legal requirements; 
 Trade and investment barriers; 
 Land use barriers; 
 Dispute settlement issues. 
 
For each area, the study examines the sources consulted and proposes a number of 
preliminary recommendations in the hope that they aid regional policy-makers in law-
making and implementation, to advance the objectives of the AEC. 
 
The team has also identified a number of gaps in legal information, which can present 
obstacles to businesses. It provides recommendations to deal with such gaps. While 
                                                            
10  The data collected was anonymised and aggregated unless respondents chose to indicate a 
preference otherwise. The team is grateful to the Canada-ASEAN Business Council - 
particularly Mr Wayne Farmer and Mr Greg Ross (and Dr Shawn Watson, Mr Ross’ 
predecessor at the CABC), Mr Vincent Dwyer of Norton Rose Fulbright LLP and Tractus Asia 
Ltd for their kind assistance in reaching out to potential respondents. As the number of 
respondents who fully completed the online survey was below 30, the team decided to use the 
survey results primarily as confirmation of other research findings. 
11  See for example, World Bank, “Trading Across Borders”, at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders. See also “Doing 
Business 2017”, http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2017 
(accessed on 23 July 2017). 
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these are not strictly “legal barriers”, the gaps in information on commercial laws and 
processes in ASEAN member States can add to business uncertainty and costs. 
 
This study aims to depart from many others in two main ways: 
 
- While viewing issues through a legal lens, legal and non-legal sources are 
consulted; 
- Feedback is sought from the business community where possible, to 
identify/confirm priority obstacles faced by businesses in the region. 
 
Given that the study cannot by its nature be exhaustive, the objective is to draw 
attention to business views on priority legal obstacles and to inject fresh thinking into 
the policy-making process where possible. 
 
Online Survey – Information about Respondents 
 
Profile of Respondents 
 
Generally, the questions required selection from a menu of responses, while some 
questions provided scope for follow-up qualitative answers. Responses were 
anonymised and/or aggregated. 
 
As Chart 1 shows, the online survey drew responses from businesses with an annual 
turnover ranging from below USD25 million to above USD500 million. 
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Chart 1: Profile of Businesses which Completed Survey 
 
Source: Online survey by the team. 
 
Chart 2 shows the proportion of respondents representing ASEAN’s 12 Priority 
Integration Sectors.12 
 
 
Chart 2: Proportion of Respondents in ASEAN’s 12 Priority Integration 
Sectors 
 
Source: Online survey by the team. 
 
                                                            
12  See also Section 3 of this interim report. 
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A majority of respondents answering the questionnaire were regional or country 
directors and line managers, as shown in Chart 3. 
 
Chart 3: Company Function/Designation of Respondents 
 
Source: Online survey by the team. 
 
 
The following chart shows the countries in which the respondent entities had 
investments. 
 
Chart 4: Countries in which Respondents had Investments 
 
 
 
Source: Online survey by the team. 
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Chart 5: Sectors which Respondents Represented
 
 
Source: Online survey by the team. 
 
 
Roundtable Discussions 
 
In addition to the survey, the team has organised three Roundtable Discussions to 
date, in Manila, Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City, to gather feedback from business and 
academic parties on legal barriers encountered in ASEAN.13 The team had the 
privilege of being hosted at three prominent law schools in these cities, whose 
academic teams helpfully gathered practitioners, academics, regulators and business 
representatives for the discussions. 
 
Ongoing Research 
 
Due to the large amount of material, not all data and literature could be examined in 
this interim report. 
 
The full study is expected to be completed by the second quarter of 2018 and to 
culminate in a final publication. The team will continue to conduct research on legal 
barriers in preparation for the final report, including the possibility of further 
Roundtables in other ASEAN cities. 
                                                            
13  The team is very grateful to the following law schools which helped to organise the Roundtables 
in their respective cities: School of Law, Ateneo de Manila University; Faculty of Law, University 
of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, and International Law Faculty, Ho Chi Minh City University 
of Law. 
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SECTION 2 CORPORATE BARRIERS 
 
Business Set-up and Continuing Obligations  
 
A supportive business environment is essential for boosting investment and growth. 
Investors have to abide by regulations that govern the setting up of businesses. The 
administrative burdens and regulatory costs associated with business set-up have to 
be borne by investing parties, and necessarily contribute to the overall cost of 
investment. Reducing such costs should therefore improve a country’s overall 
attractiveness for investors. This correlation has been repeatedly supported by a 
number of empirical studies.14 Additionally, in the context of this project, the AEC is 
dependent on better integration and connectivity within ASEAN. To this end, ASEAN 
leaders had adopted the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 in September 
2016.15 The costs of doing business will be higher if business regulation is fragmented 
across ASEAN. Harmonising these regulatory regimes across ASEAN is thus an 
important step forward, encouraging more trade and investment in the region.  
 
ASEAN Work Programme on Starting of Businesses 
 
The ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSMEs) recently developed and published a Work Programme on Starting a 
Business.16 The report examines the business start-up processes of each ASEAN 
member State, and drawing upon the work of the World Bank as well as the Economic 
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia.17 It notes that there is significant 
difference amongst the extant processes across the ASEAN member States. A 
divergence is also observed between the ASEAN-6 countries (i.e., Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), and Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
                                                            
14  Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “The 
Regulation of Entry”, (2002) 117 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1-37; Alberto Alesina, 
Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti & Fabio Schiantarelli, “Regulation and Investment”, (2005) 
3 Journal of the European Economic Association  791–825; Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven & 
Raghuram Rajan, “Entry Regulation as a Barrier to Entrepreneurship”, (2006) 82 Journal of 
Financial Economics, 591–629; Miriam Bruhn, “License to Sell: the Effect of Business 
Registration Reform on Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico”, (2011) 93 The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 382–386; Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, “The impact of business regulatory reforms on 
economic growth”, (2012) 26 Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 285-307; 
Raian Divanbeigi & Rita Ramalho, “Business Regulations and Growth”, Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. WPS 7299 (2015). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/694641468188652385/Business-regulations-and-
growth (accessed 22 July 2017); Jonathan Munemo, “Business Start-up Regulations and the 
Complementarity between Foreign and Domestic Investment” (2014) 150 Rev World Econ 
745–761; Adrian Corcoran & Robert Gillanders, “Foreign Direct Investment and the Ease of 
Doing Business”, (2015) 151 Rev World Econ 103–126; Klimis Vogiatzoglou, “Ease of Doing 
Business and FDI Inflows in ASEAN” (2016) 33 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 343-
363. 
15  http://asean.org/asean-leaders-adopt-master-plan-on-connectivity-2025/ (accessed 22 July 
2017). 
16   http://asean.org/storage/2017/02/64.-December-2016-ASEAN-Work-Programme-on-Starting-
a-Business.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017). 
17  http://www.eria.org/RPR-FY2012-8.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017). This study focused on small 
and medium enterprises. 
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Myanmar and Viet Nam (the CLMV countries). The report identifies three areas that, 
if improved, will reduce the start-up burden for businesses: restrictive regulations; 
complex procedures, and third-party involvement.18 These areas thus form the 
components of the Work Programme, to be implemented as part of the ASEAN 
Strategic Action Plan on SME Development.  
 
Survey Findings  
 
The survey asked business respondents a number of questions related to business 
set-up, as well as compliance costs.  
 
Set-up Issues 
 
The survey asked the respondents to provide information specifically on whether, in 
setting up their businesses within ASEAN, there was any aspect of the process that 
made compliance with the legal requirements cumbersome or difficult when compared 
to the requirements of the respondent’s home country. The survey provided a number 
of possible difficulties as options. The response rate for each of these difficulties is 
indicated below (Chart 6).  
 
  
                                                            
18  This refers to the involvement of third parties such as notaries and lawyers. Indeed, the costs 
of engaging lawyers in order to set up a company was flagged by one respondent to the team’s 
survey. 
10 
 
Chart 6: Survey Responses to Obstacles in Doing Business in ASEAN 
 
 
 
The survey also asked respondents to provide details of the specific obstacles that 
they had indicated as having encountered (Table 1). 
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Table 1 – Survey Responses on Obstacles to Business Set-up 
 
Obstacle  Detailed response 
(a) Complexity of registration 
procedure 
 
“Myanmar  was  time  consuming  and 
cumbersome.”  
“Local language legal documents only.” 
“Creating a company in Vietnam is incredible 
complex  with  regulatory  hurdles.  This  was 
enough to prevent us from opening an office 
there.”  
“Too many processes.” 
 
(b) Legal requirements are opaque 
 
“Myanmar  had  limited  clarity  of 
requirements.”  
“Many terms are vague.”  
“Contradictory  rules  from  regulatory 
bodies.” 
 
(c) High costs 
 
“Many law firms tend to overcharge foreign 
companies  for  incorporation  and 
shareholders agreement.”  
“Company  registration  fees,  minimum 
capital requirements, restrictions on foreign 
ownerships.”  
 
(d) Minimum paid up requirement 
 
“In Indonesia and Vietnam, a minimum paid 
up capital is required for any company.” 
“Was a challenge in the Philippines with the 
60/40 rule.”  
“Indonesia  requires  a  minimum  paid  up 
capital for any foreign‐owned company.” 
 
(e) Lengthy time taken 
 
“Myanmar was time consuming.” 
“On  client  company  establishments  in 
Myanmar, the process can take more than 6 
months.” 
“Vietnam I had a six month waiting period.” 
 
 
The survey responses are generally consistent with what other researchers have 
found in relation to the business set up processes in the different ASEAN countries.  
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The possible obstacles to investment may be generally categorised into the following 
broad areas.  
 
(i) Complicated Administrative Procedures for Business Set-up 
 
The procedural requirements for business set-up in some ASEAN member States can 
be difficult to manoeuver. Procedural complexity affects the total time that must be 
invested before a business is set up, and this in turn translates into increased costs. 
The following table shows the rankings of ASEAN countries for “Starting a Business” 
in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report.19  It should be noted that these 
rankings are based on factors beyond merely setting up a company, such as other 
licensing requirements. These other requirements are beyond the scope of this 
section.  
 
Table 2: World Bank’s Ranking for Starting a Business for ASEAN member 
States   
 
Economy  Rank 
Singapore  6 
Malaysia  23 
Thailand  46 
Viet Nam  82 
Brunei Darussalam   84 
Indonesia  91 
Philippines  99 
Lao PDR  139 
Myanmar  146 
Cambodia  180 
 
With the exception of Viet Nam, the member States specifically identified by the team’s 
respondents as having complex processes for business set-up fall in the lower half of 
the table. In particular, the process for business set-up in Myanmar appears 
particularly vexing. Although Myanmar’s government has removed many restrictions 
on businesses to improve the business environment, many of these reforms appear 
to be focused on fiscal incentives, and on the liberalisation of trade and investment. 
The Foreign Investment Law (2012), for example, which is widely regarded as a 
significant step for Myanmar, gives foreign investors additional tax incentives, more 
clearly defined lists of restricted sectors, and other benefits. The procedural aspects 
of the investment process, however, appear to require more attention.20 Kyi21 has 
                                                            
19  http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (accessed on 4 July 2017).  
20  See also Section 3 on Investment Liberalisation. 
21  Thin Thin Kyi, “Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar. Burma/Myanmar in Transition: 
Connectivity, Changes and Challenges”, International Conference on Burma/Myanmar Studies 
Burma/Myanmar in Transition: Connectivity, Changes and Challenges, Chiang Mai University, 
Thailand, 24-25 July 2015, University Academic Service Centre, available at  
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Economic%20Development/Thin-Thin-Kyi-2015-
Foreign_Direct_Investment_in_Myanmar-en.pdf (accessed 23 July 2017). 
13 
 
noted that to get the approval to start a business, not only are there numerous different 
stages and agencies22 from which to obtain approval, there is a lack of transparency 
as to the decision-making process. Whilst a survey respondent indicated a time frame 
of 6 months for approval, the World Bank’s Doing Business report estimated that 
obtaining the approval to start a business in Myanmar required 13 days in order to 
complete 11 procedures. It may well be that generalisations are neither accurate nor 
reflective of every investor’s experience. As Bissinger and Maung note, ‘[t]he  
extremes  encountered  in  this research ranged from obtaining a license on the same 
day to being unable to obtain a license after more than 5 years”.23  
 
The survey respondents also singled out Viet Nam’s regulatory regime for business 
start-up as particularly complex. In fact, many pro-investor reforms have been 
introduced in Viet Nam since 2005.24 Indeed, Viet Nam has improved significantly in 
the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings between 2011 and 2016.25 
However, the improvement in rankings was due to three specific reforms that Viet Nam 
had implemented in the areas of protecting minority investors, paying taxes and 
trading across borders.26 Procedurally, the actual process of starting a business, 
according to the World Bank Report, still required 9 procedures taking a period of 24 
days. This may explain the survey responses. 
 
Additionally, the survey responses are consistent with the views gathered at the Ho 
Chi Minh City Roundtable. Generally, participants there affirmed that setting up a new 
company in Viet Nam is too ‘time-consuming’ as it takes about three months to prepare 
all the legal documents for setting up the business and the investor must find a good 
landlord to lease the premises as the registered office. It was therefore suggested that 
a better alternative would be the acquisition of an existing Vietnamese company.  
 
 
(ii) Administrative Uncertainties 
 
This is a separate issue from the actual procedural requirements stipulated in the 
respective regulatory instruments, albeit closely linked. The greater the procedural 
complexity, requiring the involvement of more agencies, the more room there is for 
increased bureaucracy and red tape.  This not only increases the uncertainty of the 
application outcomes, but also the time and costs involved.  
                                                            
22  The power to grant operating licenses to businesses in Myanmar is spread across a wide range 
of authorities, in various union ministries and Development Affairs Organisations. 
23  Jared Bissinger & Linn Maung Maung, “Subnational Governments and Business in Myanmar”, 
Subnational Governance in Myanmar Discussion Paper Series, The Myanmar Development 
Resource Institute’s Centre for Economic and Social Development (MDRI-CESD) and The Asia 
Foundation (2014), available at    
https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SubnationalGovernmentsandBusinessinMyanmarEng
lish.pdf (accessed 4 July 2017). 
24  http://asean.org/storage/2017/02/64.-December-2016-ASEAN-Work-Programme-on-Starting-a-
Business.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017). 
25  Viet Nam moved up 9 places: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/vietnam 
(accessed 4 July 2017). 
26  http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/overview/economy/Vietnam (accessed 4 July 2017). 
14 
 
 
The chart below shows that the time taken to start a business varies across the 
member States. 
 
Chart 7: ASEAN: Time to Start a Business (days) 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016 data) 
 
 
Many ASEAN member States have streamlined their business start-up processes by 
implementing electronic systems. The adoption of relevant electronic systems for the 
purposes of business start-up is however not uniform across ASEAN. 
 
 
Table 3: Availability of Electronic Options in Incorporation 
 
Economy  Electronic 
database  for 
name searches 
Availability  of 
forms online 
Online  submission 
of documents 
Brunei Darussalam      
Cambodia27     
Indonesia    28  
Lao PDR    29  
                                                            
27  https://efiling.drcor.mcit.gov.cy/DrcorPublic/Default.aspx (accessed 22 July 2017). 
28  http://www5.bkpm.go.id/ (accessed on 22 July 2017). 
29  A standard form of the corporate constitution as well as certain forms are available for download 
from the Ministry of Planning and Investment website: 
http://www.investlaos.gov.la/index.php/resources/application-forms (accessed 22 July 2017). 
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Malaysia    30  ?31 
Myanmar     
Philippines32     
Singapore     
Thailand    33  34 
Viet Nam35     
 
Source: Compiled from a variety of sources, but subject to further verification. 
 
 
(iii) Restrictions on Foreign Participation 
 
The survey respondents were also asked whether they had a preferred type of 
business structure. Whilst most were satisfied with the existing available corporate 
structure, there was a distinct preference for the availability of a wholly foreign-owned 
company. Foreign investment restrictions vary across the ASEAN member States 
(Table 4).36 
 
Table 4: Foreign Equity Policies 
 
  Foreign Equity Policies    
BRUNEI 
DARUSALAM 
There  is  no  restriction  on  total  foreign  ownership  of  companies 
incorporated in Brunei. The Companies Act requires at least one of the 
two directors—or if more than two directors, at least two of them—
to be ordinarily resident in Brunei. 
 
CAMBODIA  There  is no  sector closed only  to  foreign  investment,37 and wholly‐ 
foreign owned  companies are permitted  in most  sectors.    In a  few 
                                                            
30  https://www.ssm.com.my/en/form-public (accessed 22 July 2017). 
31  Whilst there appears to be an e-lodgement page (see http://www.ssm.com.my/en/product-
services/e-lodgement) (accessed 22 July 2017), the information here 
(https://www.ssm.com.my/en/product-services/1-day-company-incorporation) (accessed 22 July 
2017) suggests that documents have to be physically filed with the Companies Commission of 
Malaysia. 
32  http://www.sec.gov.ph/online-services/ (accessed 22 July 2017). 
33  Although the website of the Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce 
suggests that forms are available for download: 
http://www.dbd.go.th/dbdweb_en/ewt_news.php?nid=3973&filename=index (accessed 22 July 
2017). 
34  The website of the Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce suggests that 
this is possible: http://www.dbd.go.th/dbdweb_en/ewt_news.php?nid=3966&filename=index 
(accessed 22 July 2017). During the team’s Bangkok Roundtable, a representative from the 
Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce indicated that an online platform 
for the setting up of businesses will be in operation by 2017. 
35  There is an online portal for business registration: https://dangkykinhdoanh.gov.vn/en-
gb/home.aspx (accessed 22 July 2017). 
36  See also Section 3 on Investment Liberalisation. 
37  See generally the Law on Investment of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1994 and the Law on the 
Amendment to the Law on Investment 2003, available at 
http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/law-on-investment-august-05-1994-and-law-on-the-
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sectors,  such  as  cigarette  manufacturing,  movie  production,  rice 
milling,  gemstone  mining  and  processing,  publishing  and  printing, 
radio  and  television,  wood  and  stone  carving  production,  and  silk 
weaving, foreign investment is subject to local equity participation or 
prior authorisation from authorities.38   
 
INDONESIA   IDR 2.5 billion [approx. USD 190,000]39   
There  are  restrictions  on  foreign  investment  set  out  in  the  2016 
Negative  Investment  List  (Daftar Negatif  Investasi)  as  issued  under 
Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016 Concerning Lists of Business 
Fields  That Are Closed  To  and Business  Fields  That Are Open with 
Conditions to Investment.40 
Some  restrictions  under  the  Restricted  Business  Fields  category 
include  restrictions on  foreign capital ownership  to 49%  for certain 
agricultural  related  fields,41  divestment  obligations  for mineral  and 
coal mining businesses and specific licensing requirements.42 
LAO PDR  100% foreign equity ownership is allowed in all sectors open to foreign 
investment except where the government deems the  investment to 
be detrimental to national security, health or national traditions, or to 
have a negative impact on the natural environment.43  
 
The  Investment Promotion Department of  the Ministry of Planning 
and  Investment provides  information on  the  conditions  for  foreign 
investment on its official website.44 
 
MALAYSIA  Malaysia  has  removed  its  all‐round  foreign  equity  ceiling  of  70%. 
However,  it  appears  that  despite  this,  foreign  equity  restrictions 
remain  in  certain  sectors.  These  are  imposed  by  the  different 
Ministries and government agencies, rather than by a central body. 
                                                            
amendment-to-the-law-on-investment_030324.html (accessed 22 July 2017); see also 
http://www.cambodiainvestment.gov.kh/investment-scheme/limitation-on-foreign-
investment.html (accessed 22 July 2017). 
38  https://www.export.gov/article?id=Cambodia-openness-to-foreign-investment (accessed 22 July 
2017). 
39  https://dentons.rodyk.com/en/insights/alerts/2017/july/17/foreign-investment-in-indonesia. 
(accessed 22 July 2017). This applies specifically to foreign investment companies, or PT PMA.  
40  http://www5.bkpm.go.id/images/uploads/prosedur_investasi/file_upload/REGULATION-OF-
THE-PRESIDENT-OF-THE-REPUBLIC-OF-INDONESIA-NUMBER-44-YEAR-2016.pdf 
(accessed 22 July 2017). 
41  Appendix III of the Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016.  
42  Ch 3 of the Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016. 
43  https://www.export.gov/article?id=Lao-Openness-to-Foreign-Investment (accessed 22 July 
2017). 
44  http://www.investlaos.gov.la/index.php/start-up/general-investment?start=1 (accessed 22 July 
2017). 
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There are 147 local authorities in Malaysia,45 which may impose equity 
restrictions as a condition to obtain a license.46 
 
A  separate  set  of  regulations  is  imposed  to  reserve  equity  in 
businesses for ethnic Malays or Bumiputera. The percentage of equity 
participation has been placed at 23%,47 although the position does not 
appear to be clear.  
 
Areas which are subject Bumiputera reservations include banking and 
finance,  water,  batik  production,  agriculture,  defense,  energy  and 
telecommunications. 
 
MYANMAR  USD 50,000 (service industries) 
USD 150,000 (manufacturing)48 
 
The Myanmar Companies Act 191449 distinguishes between Myanmar 
companies and foreign companies. Currently, a ‘Burmese company’ is 
defined in s 2A to mean ‘a company whose entire share capital is, at 
all times, owned and controlled by the citizens of the Union of Burma’. 
A ‘foreign company’ is correspondingly defined as ‘any company other 
than a Burmese company’.50 
 
A  new  Companies  Law51  is  being  prepared.  In  this  legislation,  the 
ownership threshold and effect is very different. Foreign investors will 
be permitted to obtain an ownership interest in a Myanmar company 
up  to a certain  threshold before  the company will be considered a 
foreign company, with the threshold expected to be 35%.52 
 
The new law will also require at least one resident director. 
 
PHILIPPINES  PHP 5000 requirement53 
                                                            
45  http://www.mida.gov.my/home/methods-of-conducting-business-in-malaysia/posts/ (accessed 
22 July 2017). 
46  Siew Yean Tham, “The AEC and Domestic Challenges in Malaysia: Examining the Liberalization 
of Services in AFAS”, (2015) 32 Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 202-219. 
47  https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204686.htm (accessed on 22 July 2017). 
48  http://www.dica.gov.mm/sites/dica.gov.mm/files/news-
files/how_to_register_company_handbook_en.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017). 
49  http://www.dica.gov.mm/sites/dica.gov.mm/files/document-
files/myanamr_companies_act_1914.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017). 
50  Section 2B of the Burma Companies Act 1914. 
51  http://www.dica.gov.mm/sites/dica.gov.mm/files/document-
files/mcl_english_version_june_2017_abc_comments_clean.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017). 
52  http://www.blplaw.com/media/how-can-we-help-
you/commercial/Myanmar_Companies_Law_Review_(English).pdf  (accessed 22 July 2017) 
53  Section 13 of the Corporation Code which provides: 
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This  requirement applies  to an export market enterprise  (i.e. more 
than 60% of the company’s revenue or output  is exported from the 
Philippines).54 
 
But in the case of a “domestic market enterprise” (where more than 
30% of the company’s sale or service  is derived from the Philippine 
market), and subject  to  the  foreign  investment negative  list,  then a 
minimum sum of US$200,000 must be remitted to a Philippines bank 
account to  set up a 100% foreign owned company.55  
Foreigners are generally not allowed to engage in retail business (as 
this is reserved for Filipinos), unless they are investing $2.5 million.56  
It  should  also  be  noted  that,  unusually,  the  Constitution  of  the 
Republic of the Philippines57 prescribes the “Filipinization”58 of certain 
areas of  investment  ‘when the national  interest dictates’,59 and of a  
“public utility”60 by  requiring  that any  form of authorisation  for  the 
operation  in  these  areas  should  be  granted  only  to  citizens  of  the 
Philippines  or  to  corporations  or  associations  organised  under  the 
laws of  the Philippines at  least sixty per centum of whose capital  is 
owned by such citizens.61  
                                                            
Amount of capital stock to be subscribed and paid for the purposes of incorporation. - At least 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the authorised capital stock as stated in the articles of incorporation 
must be subscribed at the time of incorporation, and at least twenty-five (25%) per cent of the 
total subscription must be paid upon subscription, the balance to be payable on a date or dates 
fixed in the contract of subscription without need of call, or in the absence of a fixed date or dates, 
upon call for payment by the board of directors: Provided, however, That in no case shall the 
paid-up capital be less than five Thousand (P5,000.00) pesos.  
54  Section 2 of the Republic Act No 7042 (or the Foreign Investments Act) available at 
http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/R.A.-7042-also-known-as-the-Foreign-
Investments-Act.pdf (accessed 22 July 2017). 
55  Defined in section 3 of the Republic Act No 7042 available at http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/R.A.-7042-also-known-as-the-Foreign-Investments-Act.pdf (accessed 
22 July 2017). 
56  http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Minimum-Paid-Up-Capital_Final1.pdf; 
(accessed 22 July 2017). See the Tenth Foreign Investment Negative List available at 
http://www.sec.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/EONo.-184-The-Tenth-Regular-Foreign-
Investment-Negative-List.pdf  (accessed 22 July 2017). 
57  Available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Philippines/PHILIPPINE%20CONSTITUTION.pdf. 
(accessed 22 July 2017). 
58  See Gamboa v Teves et al. (G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 2011) available at 
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/june2011/176579.html#sdfootnote41anc. 
(accessed 22 July 2017). 
59  Section 10, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the Constitution 1987. For such 
areas, see the Republic Act No 7042 (or the Foreign Investments Act).  
60  Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. 
61  The Philippines Supreme Court decided in Gamboa v Teves et al. (G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 
2011) that the term ‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of 
stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and not to the total outstanding capital stock 
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SINGAPORE  With  exceptions  for  national  security  purposes  and  in  certain 
industries (including telecommunications, broadcasting, the domestic 
news  media,  financial  services,  legal  services,  public  accounting 
services, ports and airports, and property ownership), no restrictions 
are placed on foreign ownership of Singapore corporations.  
 
A foreigner who wants to set up a company in Singapore is required 
to appoint a  locally resident director. The foreigner can continue to 
reside outside Singapore.   
 
THAILAND  Shareholders required to pay at least 25% of the registered capital.62 
The  official  fee  for  registration  of  the  MOA  for  a  private  limited 
company is 50 baht per 100,000 baht of registered capital. A fraction 
of 100,000 baht is regarded as 100,000 baht. The minimum fee is 500 
baht and the maximum fee is 25,000 baht.63 It seems likely than that 
most private companies will be registered with 100,000 Baht capital. 
The shareholders must therefore pay up at least 25% of that figure.  
 
Setting up a wholly foreign‐owned company can be difficult because 
the Foreign Business Act 199964   requires “foreigners”65 to obtain a 
foreign  business  licence.  A  Foreign  Business  License  is  generally 
granted  to  foreign  owned  businesses  that  are  unique  and  do  not 
compete with Thai businesses.66 Anecdotally, obtaining a licence can 
take years to be granted by the Ministry of Commerce.67 It is therefore 
usually recommended that a joint venture company be formed with 
the majority of shares held by a Thai citizen. Alternatively, the foreign 
                                                            
comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares. The Philippine Securities and 
Exchange Commission subsequently issued guidelines which applied the constitutionally-
required percentage of Filipino equity to both (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock 
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, 
whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors. This position has since been affirmed 
by the Supreme Court in Roy III v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, et. al. (G.R. No. 207246, 22 
November 2016). This particular point was also raised at the team’s Manila Roundtable. 
62  http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/thailand (accessed 4 July 2017). 
63  http://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=setting_up_a_business (4 July 2017). 
64  Available on the Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce webpage: 
http://www.dbd.go.th/dbdweb_en (accessed 22 July 2017). 
65   Defined in section 4 of the Foreign Business Act 1999 as including: ‘a juristic person registered 
in Thailand, being … a juristic person at least one half of capital shares of which are held by [a 
natural person who is not of Thai nationality, or a juristic person not registered in Thailand …’.  
66  Section 8 of the Foreign Business Act 1999, available at 
http://www.suthiponglaw.com/index.php?lay=show&ac=article&Id=538663419 (accessed 4 July 
2017). 
67  http://www.healyconsultants.com/thailand-company-registration/setup-llc/ (accessed 4 July 
2017). This was also alluded to by a participant at the Bangkok Roundtable who said that ‘the 
letter of the law differs from actual operation and control’.  
20 
 
investor can apply to be part of a special Board of  Investment (BOI) 
program. 
VIET NAM  A foreign investor may set up an “enterprise with one hundred (100) 
per  cent  foreign  owned  capital”.68  Such  an  enterprise  has  to  be 
established as a “limited liability company”.69 
 
It appears  that  the authorities will expect  the  investor  to commit a 
reasonable  amount  of  charter  capital  according  to  the  scale  and 
business scope of the project.70 Article 16 of the  Investment Law of 
Viet Nam also stipulates that “[t]he legal capital of an enterprise with 
foreign  owned  capital  must  be  at  least  thirty  (30)  per  cent  of  its 
invested capital. In special cases and subject to approval of the body 
in charge of State management of foreign investment, this proportion 
may  be  lower  than  thirty  (30)  per  cent.  During  the  course  of  its 
operation, an enterprise with foreign owned capital must not reduce 
its legal capital.” 
 
A  foreign  investment  certificate  is  required  and  a  minimum 
investment of USD10,000 is usually needed.71 
 
Source: Compiled from a variety of sources and subject to further verification. 
 
 
Continuing Compliance  
 
The survey sought input on the perceived difficulty of compliance with typical company 
law requirements such as the holding of annual meetings, the preparation and filing of 
financial statements and the maintenance of registers and records. The survey 
respondents did not see continuing compliance obligations as particularly onerous or 
burdensome. 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
68  Chapter 2, Article 4 of the Law on Foreign Investment in Viet Nam. See also http://www.vietnam-
briefing.com/news/setting-foreigninvested-enterprise-vietnam.html/  (accessed 4 July 2017). See 
also other restrictions for “conditional sectors” discussed in Section 4 of this Interim Report. 
69  Article 15 of the Law on Foreign Investment in Viet Nam. 
70  Participants at the Ho Chi Minh City Roundtable confirmed that whilst the Vietnamese 
government is enthusiastic about foreign investment, setting up a brand new company is an 
involved process. The participants also flagged the requirement for a registered office as being 
very important to the entire process. 
71  http://www.healyconsultants.com/vietnam-company-registration/setup-llc/  (accessed 4 July 
2017). 
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Chart 8: Survey Responses on Continuing Obligations 
 
 
 
 
Online Registry of Companies 
 
The team’s survey asked if respondents would find an online directory of companies 
registered in ASEAN countries (listing only basic information such as the company 
name in English, registered address, date and country of incorporation, names of 
directors, names of shareholders) useful. Respondents were positive about such a 
directory for the following reasons: 
Potential customers source of new business. 
Critical to mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures. 
Permits due diligence inquiries to certain extent as the existence of 
the entity can be validated. 
Point of contact and visibility of decision makers to satisfy know your 
client requirements. 
 
Preliminary Findings and Recommendations 
 
The ASEAN Work Programme on Starting a Business notes that the ultimate goal for 
ASEAN should be to harmonise the regulatory requirements for starting businesses 
across ASEAN. Discrepancies across the region will, as the Report notes, ‘slow down 
progress in establishing a common market’. Indeed, the respondents to the team’s 
survey, when asked ‘What are the three highest-priority areas of laws and procedures 
in ASEAN countries in which your company would like to see prompt improvement?’ 
indicated the following in order of priority: 
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Preliminary Recommendation 
 
The team recommends the following: 
 
(i)  Simplification of administrative processes 
 
 For member States that require physical submission of documents for 
incorporation applications, to consider making the necessary forms available 
online, and to move towards enabling fully electronic submission of 
incorporation documents (including enabling online payment of necessary 
fees). 
 Work towards a fast-track process for the incorporation of a company by any 
member State citizen or entity wishing to invest in another member State. 
 
(ii)  Foreign equity restrictions 
 
 Consider whether there are areas in which foreign equity limits may be lifted for 
investing parties which are domiciled in an ASEAN member State or who are 
citizens of an ASEAN member State. 
 
(iii) Harmonisation 
 
 Consider the feasibility of common registration requirements (including the 
possibility of basic incorporation forms that are common across ASEAN 
member States). 
 Establish a searchable online registry of companies registered in ASEAN 
member States. 
 Establish a searchable online sub-directory of MSMEs registered in ASEAN 
member States. 
  
complexity of 
procedures
• company 
registration and 
creation
• ease of business 
establishment
equity restrictions
• reduction of foreign 
investment 
restrictions
• elimination of 
minimum paid-up 
requirements for 
companies 
involving foreign 
investors
harmonisation
• standardisation and 
simplification of 
laws and 
procedures across 
ASEAN countries
• harmonisation of 
corporate laws
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SECTION 3 TRADE AND INVESTMENT BARRIERS 
 
Trade Barriers 
 
Trade barriers in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) continue to pose 
obstacles for ASEAN businesses. 
The research shows that two main areas of trade regulation and 
government activity continue to be of concern, namely: 
- The implementation of existing ASEAN agreements which 
reduce or eliminate barriers; and 
- The need for trade facilitation measures to simplify laws and 
procedures for cross-border trade in ASEAN. Such measures 
address both customs and non-customs issues. 
 
Overview and State-of-Play in ASEAN Trade 
 
Tariff Barriers 
 
Under the ASEAN Free Trade Area and ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, all 
ASEAN member States have eliminated intra-ASEAN tariffs for 99.65% of tariff lines, 
except for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam, which have reduced tariffs to 
0-5% for 98.86% of their tariff lines.72 A number of tariffs still remain, including a 
number of tariff peaks for certain goods.73 With the majority of tariffs being eliminated 
in intra-ASEAN trade, more focus is being placed on non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and 
trade facilitation measures.  
  
                                                            
72  See ASEAN, http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/asean-free-trade-area-afta-council/ 
and http://investasean.asean.org/index.php/page/view/asean-free-trade-area-
agreements/view/757/newsid/872/asean-trade-in-goods-agreement.html (accessed on 20 July 
2017). The tariff reductions have resulted from targets set under ASEAN’s Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff arrangements (CEPT) and under the ATIGA. See generally, OECD, 
Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2016, pp. 136-8. 
73  See generally, Rahul Sen, Sanchita Basu and Sadhana Srivastava, “AEC Vision Post-2015: Is 
an ASEAN Customs Union Feasible?”, ISEAS Economics Working Paper No. 2015-1, February 
2015, pp. 9-10. 
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Non-Tariff Barriers 
 
A significant number of non-tariff measures (NTMs) which impede trade continue to 
exist.74 This is confirmed both by literature and feedback from businesses.75 
 
Through the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC 2025), ASEAN 
member States have prioritised a) the harmonisation or mutual recognition of 
standards, conformance and technical regulations of products for three prioritised key 
sectors, and b) making NTMs more transparent and to reduce trade-distorting NTMs.76 
 
A number of databases provide information on ASEAN NTMs.77 
 
The Table below shows the NTMs notified by ASEAN countries as at July 2017. The 
categories these NTMs fall under are sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS), technical 
barriers to trade (TBT), anti-dumping (AD), safeguards (SG), special safeguards 
(SSG), quantitative restrictions (QRs), tariff rate quotas (TRQ) and export subsidies 
(XS). 
  
                                                            
74  See ERIA, “Non-Tariff Measures in ASEAN” Edited by Lili Yan Ing, Santiago Fernandez de 
Cordoba, and Olivier Cadot (2016), available at: 
http://www.eria.org/publications/key_reports/FY2015/No.01.html (accessed on 17 July 2017). 
See also country-specific studies such as “A Field Survey: Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) Faced 
by Exporters of Lao PDR, Package No. RFP/08/FY14, Second Trade Development Facility, 
Project No. P130512, 4 September 2016. 
75  The team’s discussion with a Lao business representative confirmed that Lao PDR businesses 
face NTBs when trading with other ASEAN countries; teleconference discussion, 26 April 2017. 
See also, Rahul Sen, Sanchita Basu and Sadhana Srivastava, “AEC Vision Post-2015: Is an 
ASEAN Customs Union Feasible?”, ISEAS Economics Working Paper No. 2015-1, February 
2015, pp. 11-13. 
76  MPAC 2025, pp. 59-61.  
77  These include the WTO Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) and the ASEAN NTM 
Database: http://asean.org/?static_post=non-tariff-measures-database (accessed on 23 July 
2017). Other tools being developed and implemented are the ASEAN Tariff Finder, ASEAN 
Trade Repository (ATR; developed along with National Trade Repositories of each member 
State, to increase transparency of trade laws) and the ASEAN Solutions for Investments, Trade 
and Services (ASSIST, an online complaints system).  
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Table 5: NTMs notified by ASEAN member States at the WTO 
 
 
Source: WTO I-TIP Database, July 2017. 
 
Such NTMs are not necessarily more trade-restrictive than necessary or violative of 
treaty commitments. The utility of the Table is twofold: 
- it shows where the most notified NTMs are found; 
- it raises the question as to whether ASEAN member States can do more to 
reduce these NTMs, particularly if they relate to goods in the ASEAN Priority  
Integration Sectors. 
 
The ASEAN Trade Repository (ATR) is to be the database of ASEAN trade laws, 
tariffs, NTMs and other information. The ASEAN Secretariat also maintains a very 
useful “Matrix of Actual Cases” which provides information on reports of NTBs 
received from ASEAN member States.78 
 
Comparing the information available from the WTO web facility on NTMs with 
ASEAN’s ATR and Matrix of Actual Cases, the following observations may be made: 
 
 The ATR does not appear to integrate the ASEAN Matrix of Actual Cases in 
its searchable database; 
 The latest date of input of material is unclear. 
 
  
                                                            
78  See ASEAN Secretariat, http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/asean-free-trade-area-
afta-council/other-documents/ (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
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Preliminary Recommendation 
 
The team recommends that the ATR and Matrix of Actual Cases be integrated to 
provide an up-to-date, searchable database. 
 
Note: 
Under the AEC Blueprint 2025, member States aim to “explore alternative ways to 
addressing NTMs such as sectoral or value chain approaches to deal with NTMs”. 
This provides scope for further, separate research on ways to reduce NTMs within the 
regional and global value chain context. 
 
 
The ASEAN ‘Noodle Bowl’79 - Multiplication of FTAs and Rules 
 
Preferential trade agreements contain rules of origin (ROOs) which determine whether 
imports enjoy preferential tariff treatment under the agreements. ROOs therefore 
serve a gate-keeping function to the benefits of such trade agreements. 
 
As trade agreements may have different ROO requirements, this leads to a complex 
web of rules for exporters and importers, when determining whether preferences are 
enjoyed by their goods. In addition, under each agreement, there may certain product-
specific rules (PSRs). As ASEAN countries may each have preferential agreements 
with a number of other countries, all this makes determination of the applicable rule 
complicated for businesses.80 
 
The team’s survey supports the finding that complex rules can be a concern for 
businesses in the region.81 
 
Implementation of Existing Legal Obligations 
 
Three key ASEAN transport agreements to facilitate cross-border trade are still not 
fully ratified or implemented.82 The ASEAN Transport Strategic Plan 2016-2025 aims 
to operationalise these three Agreements, which are: 
                                                            
79  The expression is a variant of the reference to a myriad of rules in a “spaghetti bowl” by 
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati; see Bhagwati, J. “US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free 
Trade Agreements”, Discussion paper series, Columbia University, 1995. 
80  A number of steps have been taken to address these concerns, including the ASEAN Self-
Certification System; See ASEAN Secretariat, 
http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/October/outreach-
document/Edited%20ROO%20Self%20Certification.pdf (accessed on 23 July 2017), 
Singapore Customs, 
https://www.customs.gov.sg/~/media/cus/files/insync/issue11/article_5.html (accessed on 23 
July 2017) and USAID, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00MBQH.pdf (accessed on 23 July 
2017). See also generally, Stefano Inama and Edmund W. Sim, “Rules of Origin in ASEAN – A 
Way Forward”, Cambridge University Press (2015). 
81  See also OECD, “Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2016”, p. 138.  
82  See ASEAN, https://acts.asean.org/publications/asean-framework-agreement-facilitation-
goods-transit-afafgit. 
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 the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit 
(AFAFGIT);83 84 
 the ASEAN Framework Agreement On The Facilitation Of Inter-State Transport 
(AFAFIST); and 
 the ASEAN Agreement on Multimodal Transport (AFAMT). 
 
 
Trade Facilitation and Legal Barriers in ASEAN 
 
Trade facilitation is a critical component in advancing the AEC’s legal and regulatory 
connectivity. Trade facilitation components which require legal support and removal of 
barriers include transparency, formalities, paperless trade and transit facilitation 
arrangements.85 
 
Recognising the impact which regulatory activity can have on business costs, ASEAN 
Economic Ministers agreed in March 2017 to reduce 10% of trade transaction costs 
by 2020.86 Trade facilitation is an important contributor to the realizing of this aim. 
ASEAN members are aware of the costs of “red tape” and have taken a number of 
important steps to address trade facilitation, with the Philippines National Competitive 
Council embarking on a “Project Repeal” to reduce ‘red tape’ in laws, regulations and 
government procedures to raise the competitiveness of the country as an investment 
destination and for its businesses.87 
 
A lack of harmonisation of customs procedures, customs tariffs and of mutual 
acceptance of documents in ASEAN, and arbitrariness in estimating the value of 
goods for tariff purposes, can impede cross-border trade.88  
                                                            
83  Date of signing: 1998, ratified by 1999, date of entry into force: 2000. Under Article 33, the 
Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of Instruments of Ratification or Acceptance 
by all Contracting Parties with the ASEAN Secretary-General. See ASEAN, 
https://acts.asean.org/publications/asean-framework-agreement-facilitation-goods-transit-
afafgit. As at May 2017: Protocols signed and ratified by all ten member States are 3, 4, 5, 8;  
8 member States have signed Protocol 2, Protocols 1, 6, 7 and 9 have not been ratified by all 
member States. See Joint Media Statement of the 26th Meeting of the ASEAN Directors-
General of Customs, Bali, 16 -18 Indonesia May 2017 at asean.org/storage/2017/05/DG-26-
41-Joint-Media-Statement.pdf. 
84  The Protocol 7 Customs Transit System initiative, led by Singapore, is progressing; under the 
ASEAN Customs Transit System initiative, traders will only need a single customs document 
and one guarantee for transit to trade in countries of the region. See Singapore Customs, 
https://www.customs.gov.sg/~/media/cus/files/insync/issue25/article2.pdf (accessed on 20 
July 2017). See also ASEAN Economic Integration Brief, No. 1, June 2017. 
85  See for example, these parameters used in the Joint United Nations Regional Commissions, 
“Trade Facilitation and Paperless Trade Implementation Survey 2015 - Asia and the Pacific 
Report”, ESCAP (2015). A Global report and regional reports on a 2017 survey is expected to 
be published in the near future. 
86  ASEAN Economic Integration Brief, June 2017, p. 3. 
87  See http://www.investphilippines.info/arangkada/tag/project-repeal/. 
88  Nimnual Piewthongngam S.J.D. & Prasert Vijitnopparat, “Trade Facilitation – Cost of Non-
cooperation for Consumers in the ASEAN Economic Community”, Asia Foundation, February 
2014, pp. 25-26. See also, ASEAN Business Advisory Council Report to Leaders, September 
2016. 
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Documentary Compliance Requirements 
 
The World Bank’s Doing Business 2017 East Asia and Asia-Pacific (DB 2017 EAAP) 
data suggests that documentary compliance in import and export of goods in ASEAN 
can still be very time-consuming and expensive. Charts 9 and 10 below show the 
unevenness in time and costs taken for documentary compliance with respect to 
importing goods in ASEAN member States. The data suggests that a great deal more 
attention to facilitating documentary compliance – which is linked to legal requirements 
and procedures - is required.89 
 
 
Chart 9: ASEAN: Documentary Compliance – Time (Hours) and Costs (USD) to 
Import 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data in DB 2017 EAAP 
 
  
                                                            
89  Other measures of time taken for imports are available, such as those of logistics associations; 
see “Vietnam Logistics Industry Draws Global Attention”, 12 July 2017, Vietnamnet. 
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Chart 10: ASEAN: Documentary Compliance – Time (Hours) and Costs (USD) 
to Export 
 
 
 
 Source: Based on data in DB 2017 EAAP 
 
 
National Single Windows (NSWs) 
 
ASEAN members have committed to the establishment of NSWs to facilitate electronic 
processing of customs documents. As at July 2017, not all ASEAN member States 
have operational NSWs. In the case of Cambodia, for instance, only specific pilot/trial 
projects with selected businesses have been in progress, and the NSW is not fully 
operational yet. Customs documents must be still be submitted for approval in paper 
form (though these are downloadable from a website).90 
 
ASEAN Single Window (ASW) 
 
The ASW, which will integrate NSWs, will facilitate clearance of goods, decrease 
business costs and improve transparency of customs procedures in the region.91 
Member States have committed legally to the ASW.92 
                                                            
90  The team’s discussion with a Lao business representative, teleconference discussion, 26 April 
2017. 
91  See ASEAN, at: http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/October/outreach-
document/Edited%20ASEAN%20Single%20Window-2.pdf (accessed on 2 August 2017). 
92  See the Agreement to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 9 December 2005; text available at: http://asean.org/?static_post=agreement-to-
establish-and-implement-the-asean-single-window-kuala-lumpur-9-december-2005-2, 
Protocol to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 20 
December 2006 and Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASEAN Single 
Window, Hanoi, Vietnam, 4 September 2015. 
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Pilot projects have been undertaken with the following documents for ASW 
exchange:93 
 
 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) Form D; 
 ASEAN Customs Declaration Document (ACDD). 
 
Member States are gradually transitioning into ‘live’ exchanges of these documents 
on the ASW – at least four member States are ready for such exchanges (see Table 
6 below). Two of ASEAN’s least developed countries, Cambodia94 and Lao PDR95  are 
aiming to join the “live” exchange by the end of 2017. Brunei has a NSW but has not 
joined the ASW.96 Myanmar launched the Myanmar Automated Cargo Clearance 
System in January 2016 as a step toward a NSW.97 
 
TABLE 6: State of Play of ASEAN Single Window Legal Implementation 
 
ASEAN Member 
State 
Exchange‐Readiness 
with e‐ATIGA Form D 
Brunei  
Cambodia  By end 2017 
Lao PDR  By end 2017 
Myanmar  
Philippines  
Indonesia   (“live”) 
Malaysia  (“live”)98 
Singapore   (“live”) 
Thailand  (“live”)99 
Vietnam  
 
Source: Extracted from Table in ASEAN Business Advisory Council Report to the 
Leaders, September 2016 and updated by research team with information as at July 
2017. 
 
 
 
                                                            
93  See ASEAN, http://asw.asean.org/about-asw. See also 
http://asw.asean.org/component/content/category/13-static-pages. 
94  Cambodia has committed to testing in mid-2017 and to go live with exchange e-ATIGA Form D 
by the end of 2017See http://asw.asean.org/nsw/cambodia/cambodia-general-information. 
95  Lao PDR’s NSW was launched at the end of 2016 and expects to join ASW by the end of 2017. 
See http://asw.asean.org/nsw/lao-pdr/lao-pdr-general-information/. For further updates, see 
generally, http://asw.asean.org/#.  
96  See http://www.bdnsw.gov.bn/Pages/Home.aspx. 
97  See http://asw.asean.org/nsw/myanmar/myanmar-general-information (accessed on 20 July 
2017) and http://www.myanmartradeportal.gov.mm/index.php?r=site/display&id=771. 
98  See MITI, at: http://www.miti.gov.my/index.php/pages/view/3794. 
99  See https://d2oc0ihd6a5bt.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/1871/2012/04/ASEAN-
Custom-Integration-and-ASEAN-Single-Window.pdf. 
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Harmonised Tariff Classification 
 
The ASEAN Agreement on Customs provides for member States to adopt a standard 
code at the 8-digit level, to provide consistency and facilitate trade. The ASEAN 
harmonised code (AHTN 2017), harmonised at the 8-digit level across all ASEAN 
member States, is in effect in a majority of member States. Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Philippines and Viet Nam are continuing to implement its use.100 
 
 
Standardised Customs Fees and Valuations, Advance Rulings and Average 
Release Times 
 
ASEAN has worked continually on various trade facilitation actions, including those 
under the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuations and the ASEAN Customs 
Agreement.101 Implementation issues of such agreements still exist. For example, 
arbitrary classification of products and ad hoc tariff pricing have been identified by 
businesses to still exist.102  
 
Two areas which have been raised in the trade literature as being able to provide 
greater certainty and transparency in ASEAN are the provision of advance rulings 
and establishment and publication of average release times for goods.103 Advance 
rulings may pertain to rules of origin (e.g. under the WTO Agreement on ROO), tariff 
classification and valuation. Advance rulings systems have been put in place in the 
member States to provide greater certainty and predictability to traders. However, not 
all ASEAN member States provide information on average release times of goods. 
 
  
                                                            
100  HS codes are used to determine the tariffs, controls and rule of origin of goods and for trade 
statistics; Singapore Customs: https://www.customs.gov.sg/businesses/harmonized-system-
hs-classification-of-goods. 
101  Phuket, Thailand, 1 March 1997. ASEAN has also developed an ASEAN Customs Valuation 
Guide (2003) for customs authorities. 
102  See Miti Garg and Sumeet Gupta (eds.), “Cases on Supply Chain and Distribution 
Management: Issues and Principles”, Business Science Reference (2012), at p. 65. For country 
illustrations, see for example, Myrna S. Austria, “The Philippines and the AEC Beyond 2015”, 
(2015) 32 Journal of Southeast Asian Economics 220, pp. 220-238, at p. 229, citing Wignaraja, 
Ganesh, Dorothea Lazaro and Genevieve DeGuzman. “FTAs and the Philippine Business: 
Evidence from Transport, Food and Electronics Firms”. ADB Working Paper 185. Tokyo: Asian 
Development Bank, 2010, and report, “Long Improvised Customs Fees to be Subsidized”, 28 
February 2017, Cambodia Daily. See also Banomyong, note 126126 below, on the issues in 
the context of logistics service contracts in CLMV. 
103  See Joint United Nations Regional Commissions, “Trade Facilitation and Paperless Trade 
Implementation Survey 2015 - Asia and the Pacific Report”, ESCAP (2015). A Global report 
and regional reports on a 2017 survey is expected to be published in the near future.  
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International Trade Facilitation Tools 
 
Tools designed to address supply chain security as well as facilitate international trade 
include Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programmes.104 Such programmes 
allow countries to establish trade facilitative measures to expedite import, export, 
transit and other formalities for entities which meet set security and internal controls 
criteria as Authorized Economic Operators. The AEC Blueprint 2025 aims to “deepen 
regional implementation of trade-facilitative ASEAN initiatives such as 
Authorised Economic Operators (AEO) programme and Self-Certification 
programme”.105 
The WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which all ASEAN 
member States have accepted, requires each WTO member that 
accepts the agreement to provide particular trade facilitation 
measures (over and above general trade facilitation measures in 
the TFA) related to import, export, or transit formalities and 
procedures in at least three of the following areas to specified 
“authorised operators” who meet certain criteria (such as 
AEOs):106 
(a) low documentary and data requirements, as appropriate; 
(b) low rate of physical inspections and examinations, as 
appropriate; 
(c) rapid release time, as appropriate; 
(d) deferred payment of duties, taxes, fees, and charges; 
(e) use of comprehensive guarantees or reduced guarantees; 
(f) a single customs declaration for all imports or exports in a 
given period; and 
(g) clearance of goods at the premises of the authorized operator 
or another place authorized by customs.107 
                                                            
104  See Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Trade (SAFE Framework), World 
Customs Organization (2012), http://tfig.unece.org/contents/wco-safe.htm and 
http://tfig.unece.org/contents/authorized-economic-operators.htm. 
105  The aim is to establish an ASEAN-wide self-certification programme; see e.g. “Asean to focus 
on digital economy, trade facilitation in 2018 with Singapore as chair”, 4 May 2017, Business 
Times, http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/asean-to-focus-on-digital-
economy-trade-facilitation-in-2018-with-singapore-as. 
106  Art. 7.7, TFA. The TFA entered into force on 22 February 2017. The list of WTO members 
which have ratified the TFA can be found here: http://www.tfafacility.org/ratifications (accessed 
on 23 July 2017). As at 23 July 2017, of the ASEAN member States, only Indonesia has not 
ratified the agreement yet. 
107  Art. 7.3, TFA. 
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Presently, not all ASEAN countries operate Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) 
programmes. Those which do are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam.108 ASEAN member States which have accepted the TFA but which have not 
established AEO programmes - namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,109 Lao PDR, 
Myanmar110 and the Philippines - will need establish such programmes in accordance 
to the schedules set out in the TFA, and the trade facilitation obligations for AEOs 
under it, as shown above.111 The use of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) can 
contribute to building regional trust in AEOs and further facilitate trade. 
 
The use of AEOs can also help MSMEs, if such enterprises are provided with suitable 
training to make use of the systems.112  
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
The team recommends: 
 Implementation of existing agreements; 
 Rollback and standstill of NTMs and restrictions for services in Priority 
Integration Sectors; 
 Alignment of trade facilitation actions with requirements of the TFA and 
accelerating implementation of the TFA where possible;  
 Establishment of AEO systems in all ASEAN member States; and 
 Implementation of trade facilitation measures with AEOs and MSMEs in mind. 
 
Regulatory Issues 
 
In some countries, there appear to be too many laws regulating an area of trade. For 
example, in some situations, there could be one main law leading to implementing 
regulations, under which further new rules are created by separate agencies.113 
Discussions during the team’s Roundtables appeared to support this view. 
 
                                                            
108  Asian countries (apart from those in ASEAN) using AEO programmes include China, Chinese 
Taipei, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea; see Compendium of Authorized Economic Operator 
Programmes, World Customs Organization (2016), available at: 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/tools/aeo-
compendium.aspx. 
109  Cambodia’s best traders programme to lead to AEO implementation by 2018: 
http://www.customs.gov.kh/businesstraders-3/best-traders/ (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
110  Myanmar is expected to introduce an AEO system in October 2017: 
https://www.jiffa.or.jp/en/news/entry-4489.html (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
111  The TFA implementation system permits developing countries and least developed countries 
to self-designate in relation to the implementation periods – see Art. 14.2 TFA; see generally, 
Section II, TFA. 
112  “Making WTO TFA Work for SMEs”, UNESCAP, pp. 8-9. 
113  See for example, report on the area of food safety and hygiene regulation in Vietnam, “In VN, 
Many Ministries Oversee One Noodle”, 7 July 2017, VietNamNet News, at: 
“http://m.english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/181597/in-vn--many-ministries-oversee-one-
noodle.html. See also report on this sector, stating that: “In the legal system of food safety 
legislation, there is one law, one decree and nearly 80 circulars of the combined three 
ministries.” Finance Vietnam, Intelliasia, 2 April 2017, at pp. 27-28.  
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One respondent to the team’s online survey cited specifically a related concern: a “lack 
of clarity on export controls”. 
 
Supply Chain Contracts 
 
The team’s survey received a number of responses from businesses which were 
engaged in supply chains. 
To the question, “Does your company use or participate in a supply 
chain in ASEAN for its goods?”: 
33.3% of the 15 respondents who answered this question replied in 
the affirmative. 
To the follow-up question, “Would a set of model contract provisions 
that could be adopted and commonly used by ASEAN supply chain 
users be useful to your business?”: 
four out of the five (80%) respondents replied in the affirmative. 
Note: 
 
While the number of responses is small, the above responses suggest that there may 
be scope to explore establishment of model contract clauses in ASEAN supply chains 
in separate, further research.  
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Investment Barriers 
 
Foreign Investment Restrictions 
 
While a degree of investment liberalisation has occurred in the AEC significant legal 
barriers still exist within ASEAN. Investment liberalisation under the ACIA is 
ongoing.114  
The ACIA’s investment liberalisation agenda is presently limited 
to the following sectors: 
(a) manufacturing; 
(b) agriculture; 
(c) fishery; 
(d) forestry; 
(e) mining and quarrying; 
(f) services incidental to manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, 
forestry, mining and quarrying; and 
(g) any other sectors, as may be agreed upon by all Member 
States.115 
The liberalisation provisions also exclude measures under services under the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). As will be seen below, the AFAS 
liberalisation negotiations are handled separately. ASEAN countries are working 
towards a new agreement for services liberalisation, the Agreement on Trade in 
Services (ATISA).116 Under AFAS, seven priority sectors were identified:117 
 
 Air transport 
 Business services 
 Construction 
 Financial services 
 Maritime transport 
 Telecommunications 
 Tourism. 
                                                            
114  See Art. 1, 2 and 9, ACIA, the member States’ Reservation Lists, and OECD, “Economic 
Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2016”, at p. 151. 
115  Art. 3.3, ACIA. On ASEAN investment liberalisation, see generally, Ponciano S. Intal Jr, “AEC 
Blueprint Implementation Performance and Challenges: Investment Liberalization”, ERIA-DP-
2015-32, April 2015. 
116  For an overview, see ASEAN, http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/sectoral-bodies-
under-the-purview-of-aem/services/overview/ (accessed on 22 July 2017). 
117  Bangkok Declaration, signed at the Fifth ASEAN Summit, 1995. 
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Further, under the AEC Blueprint 2007, particular services were identified as Priority 
Sectors for accelerated liberalisation.118 Member States were to remove substantially 
all restrictions on trade in services for air transport, e-ASEAN, healthcare and 
tourism by 2010 and for logistics services, by 2013. Further, the Blueprint set the 
following target dates for Mode 3 liberalisation, allowing for foreign (ASEAN) equity 
participation: 
 
 of not less than 51% by 2008, and 70% by 2010 for the 4 priority 
services sectors; 
 not less than 49% by 2008, 51% by 2010, and 70% by 2013 for logistics 
services; and 
 not less than 49% by 2008, 51% by 2010, and 70% by 2015 for other 
services sectors. 
 
However, as will be seen below, foreign equity barriers which do not meet the 70% 
target remain for investments in, for example, logistics and e-commerce services. 
They also exist for services relating to financial services and infrastructure. Yet 
these are four major areas which undergird the development of modern global and 
regional value chains. 
 
Investment barriers are a continuing concern for businesses seeking to make 
investments in ASEAN. The existence of problematic investment restrictions was 
confirmed by the team’s survey responses. The survey drew responses indicating 
liberalisation of investment restrictions as one of the top three priorities for some 
companies, ranging from those with annual turnover below USD 25m to those with a 
turnover above USD 500m.119 
 
Other studies have also identified investment barriers – particularly in the form of 
foreign equity participation – as problems. The ASEAN Business Advisory Council 
(ASEAN-BAC), for example, has identified the removal of foreign equity constraints in 
four sectors – insurance, transport/logistics, telecommunications and financial 
services - as part of their top 10 recommendations to ASEAN leaders in September 
2016.120 
 
Some of the investment barriers illustrated below were introduced or are being 
maintained after the establishment of these service sectors as priority sectors. In 
addition, it has been observed that the level of services restrictiveness in ASEAN 
generally remains high.121 
                                                            
118  See ASEAN Integration in Services (2015), pp. 18-19. 
119  These responses were provided to the survey question, “What are the three highest-priority 
areas of laws and procedures in ASEAN which your company would like to see prompt 
improvement in?” 
120  ASEAN-BAC Report to Leaders Sep 2016, p. 2. 
121  See See Figure 2.8, Overall Services Trade Restrictiveness Index in ASEAN, 2008-11, OECD, 
“Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2016”, at p. 144. According to the 
report, “ASEAN Services Integration”, ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank (2015), based on 
2012 surveys, despite the efforts under the AFAS, services liberalisation within ASEAN has 
only been “moderate” in general (p. 53). Restrictions exist in relation to the supply of services 
37 
 
 
ASEAN PRIORITY INTEGRATION SECTORS 
Agro-based products        
Air travel        
Automotives               
e-ASEAN 
Electronics 
Fisheries        
Healthcare        
Logistics (added in 2006)    
Rubber-based products     
Textiles and apparels     
Tourism           
Wood-based products     
 
One of the objectives of establishing the Priority Integration Sectors was to accelerate 
services liberalisation in them.122 Two of the above overlap with the AFAS priority 
sectors: e-ASEAN and logistics. 
 
The AEC Blueprint 2025 also aims to “explore alternative approaches for further 
liberalisation of services”.123 
 
One possible approach is to re-examine the overlapping priority areas under the 
Priority Integration Sectors (for goods) and the AFAS Priority Sectors, together with 
financial and infrastructure services, and their combined role in meeting global value 
chain (GVC) needs. A re-grouping of the four related services areas below can help 
to refocus liberalisation efforts in a manner that better responds to such needs: 
 
 Logistics services and e-commerce (as part of e-ASEAN); and 
 Financial services and infrastructure services. 
 
Together, these four services areas could be grouped as a Priority Cluster, which 
together can better facilitate ASEAN businesses’ participation in GVCs. 
 
The following discussion illustrates some existing investment restrictions found in 
these four areas. 
 
 
 
                                                            
under “Mode 3” (under the WTO’s terminology) through commercial presence in the country in 
question. 
122  Article 5, ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Priority Integration Sectors, Vientiane, Lao 
PDR, 29 November 2004. See also ASEAN, http://asean.org/asean-framework-agreement-for-
the-integration-of-priority-sectors-vientiane-29th-november-2004/ (accessed on 24 July 2017). 
123  Para. A2.13. 
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A. Logistics Services-related Foreign Investment Restrictions 
 
ASEAN member States have found that “logistics efficiency has not improved at the 
pace originally envisaged by MPAC 2010”.124 The following are examples of 
restrictions which some ASEAN member States continue to maintain the right to 
impose in relation to logistics-related investments. 
 
Examples: 
 
Indonesia 
 
TABLE 7:    Examples of Foreign Investment Restrictions in Logistics 
 
 
ASEAN Priority 
Sector Affected 
 
Examples of Related 
Investment Barriers125 
 
 
Restriction 
 
 
Logistics 
Various  forms  of 
transportation 
Maximum  49%  Foreign  Capital 
ownership 
Freight forwarding services and 
air freight forwarding services 
Maximum  67%  Foreign  Capital 
ownership 
Multimode transport services  Maximum  49%  Foreign  Capital 
ownership 
 
 
Restrictions Maintained under the Protocol to Implement the Ninth Package of 
Commitments under AFAS 
 
Brunei Darussalam 
 
Brunei has maintained, for storage and warehousing and marine freight forwarding, a 
restriction that foreign equity participation must not exceed 51%. 
 
Thailand 
 
Under the Protocol, for various logistics-related services, Thailand has maintained 
restrictions such that foreign equity participation is not to exceed 49%, 51% or 70% 
(depending on the service in question) and in the latter two categories, also only 
through a joint venture with a Thai juridical person. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
124  MPAC 2025, p. 9. 
125   Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016. 
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CLMV 
 
Within Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam, for example, a number of legal 
barriers exist in respect of logistics services.126 Two examples of such barriers are 
foreign investment restrictions127 and the lack of standardised logistics contracts.128 
 
Malaysia - incentives 
 
For integrated logistics services including warehousing, transportation and freight 
forwarding, at least 60% of equity must be owned by Malaysians to receive 
incentives.129 However, companies which are approved as International Integrated 
Logistics Services (IILS) providers (companies that provide integrated and seamless 
logistics services (door-to-door) along the logistics supply chain as a single entity on 
a regional or global scale) are allowed 100% foreign equity ownership.130 
 
 
B. E-Commerce: Preliminary Observations 
 
The E-ASEAN Framework Agreement has to date been signed and ratified by only six 
member States and is not yet in force.131 However, ASEAN has been proceeding to 
facilitate e-commerce in other ways, such as through the AEC Blueprint 2025 and the 
ASEAN Framework on Data Protection. 
 
ASEAN e-commerce is an area which merits further separate research. Foreign equity 
restrictions still exist in the logistics, telecommunications and financial sectors, three 
sectors which undergird e-commerce activities as well as certain regional and global 
value chains. 
 
Interestingly, for green field investments, foreign equity restrictions for mobile 
telecommunications suppliers have been removed not only in more developed 
countries such as Singapore and Thailand, but also in Cambodia, Laos PDR and 
Myanmar.132 
 
                                                            
126  For a background on logistics issues in CLMV, see Ruth Banomyong, “Logistics Challenges in 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam”, in “A Study on Upgrading Industrial Structure of 
CLMV Countries” (eds. Ruth Banomyong and Masami Ishida), ERIA Research Project Report 
2009-7-3 (2010), available at: http://www.eria.org/publications/research_project_reports/a-
study-on-upgrading-industrial-structure-of-clmv-countries.html. 
127  Banomyong, pp. 409-410. 
128  Banomyong, p. 410. 
129  MIDA, Logistics Services booklet, pp. 8-9. 
130  It has been suggested elsewhere that investment incentives should be harmonised, to avoid a 
conflict in trade and investment policies; see Myrna S. Austria, “The Philippines and the AEC 
Beyond 2015: Managing Domestic Challenges”, Journal of Southeast Asian Economies, Vol. 
32, No. 2, August 2015, pp. 220-238, at p. 234. The same author suggests that investment 
promotion and facilitation be centralised under one agency (at same page). 
131  See ASEAN Secretariat, http://agreement.asean.org/home/index/10.html (accessed on 20 July 
2017). 
132   “ASEAN Services Integration”, ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank (2015), pp. 60-62. 
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E-Commerce-related Foreign Investment Restrictions 
 
Example: Indonesia 
 
In May 2016, Indonesia amended its foreign investment restrictions for e-commerce 
to permit up to 49% foreign ownership,133 as shown in Table 8 below. 
 
TABLE 8:    Examples of Foreign Investment Restrictions in E-commerce 
 
ASEAN Priority Sector 
Affected 
Examples of Related 
Investment Barriers 
Restriction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E‐Commerce 
 
 
Electronic  commerce 
transaction providers  
(platform‐based  market 
place,  daily  deals,  price 
grabber,  online  classified 
advertising)  with  an 
investment  value  of  less 
than IDR100,000,000,000  
Maximum  49%  Foreign 
Capital ownership134 
Retail  sale  through  mail 
order and internet 
 
Reserved for SMEs135 
Retail business  for any kind 
of  product  via  electronic 
system (e.g. liquor)  
 
100%  Domestic  Capital 
requirement136 
E‐payment  service 
companies  (November 
2016)137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank  Indonesia  licensing 
requirements for e‐payment 
service providers, and for e‐
wallet service providers with 
at least 300,000 users 
Also,  may  require 
registration  as  Perseroan 
Terbatas  (with  80% 
ownership by an Indonesian 
                                                            
133  Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016, 12 May 2016 (text in English available at: 
http://www5.bkpm.go.id/en/investment-procedures/negative-investment-list) (accessed on 23 
July 2017), amending the position in the previous Negative List in Presidential Regulation 
39/2014. See generally, http://www.lhrplaw.com/news-19-The-New-Indonesian-Negative-List-
Investment--Presidential-Regulation-No.-44-of-2016.html. 
134  Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016. 
135  Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016. 
136  Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016. 
137  Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 18/40/PBI/2016. See also 
http://www.reuters.com/article/indonesia-investment-regulations-idUSL4N1DG271 (accessed 
on 23 July 2017). 
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  citizen  or  entity)  in  certain 
cases. 
 
C. Financial Services Restrictions 
 
ASEAN member States have been negotiating to progressively liberalise investment 
regulation of financial services under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services 
(AFAS). These liberalisation actions are separate from the investment liberalisation 
actions under the ACIA. 
 
In the most recent round of negotiations in 2016, improved access in financial access 
can be found in the Protocol to Implement the Seventh Package of Commitments on 
Financial Services under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services.138 The 
following are some examples of restrictions which remain, for foreign investors. 
 
Example: Thailand 
 
In 2016, The Thai Ministry of Commerce removed certain requirements for foreign 
commercial banks, bank branches and life insurance, property and casualty insurance 
companies to operate in Thailand.139 However, some specific legal requirements (such 
as foreign ownership of equity) still exist.140  
 
D. Infrastructure 
 
Apart from the Priority Integration Sectors, infrastructure is an important area of focus 
in the AEC.141 Yet, a number of investment restrictions remain in relation to services 
that are essential to building ASEAN infrastructure and connectivity, whether physical 
or virtual.142 
 
The following are examples of construction and telecommunication investment 
restrictions as at July 2017. 
 
 
                                                            
138  Hanoi, Vietnam, 23 June 2016, in force from 20 December 2016. 
139   Ministerial Regulation Prescribing Service Business Not Requiring Foreign Businesses 
License (No. 2) B.E. 2559 (2016). See also report, “Four Businesses to be Removed from FBA 
Annex III“, 11 November 2015, The Nation, at: 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Four-businesses-to-be-removed-from-FBA-Annex-
III-30272647.html (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
140  See for example, section 16 of the Financial Institutions Businesses Act 2008, B.E. 2551(2008); 
https://www.bot.or.th/English/AboutBOT/LawsAndRegulations/SiteAssets/Law_E24_Institutio
n_Sep2011.pdf (unofficial English translation, accessed on 23 July 2017). 
141  See AEC Blueprint 2025, ASEAN MPAC 2025 and “ASEAN Investment Report 2015, 
Infrastructure Investment and Connectivity”, at  http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/ASEAN-
Investment-report-2015.pdf (accessed on 23 July 2017). Meeting ASEAN’s infrastructure 
needs will help facilitate regional connectivity, which can in turn facilitate trade and investment 
in the region. 
142  See generally, ASEAN, http://asean.org/?static_post=foreign-equity-policies (accessed on 23 
July 2017). 
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Examples: 
 
Brunei 
 
Under the Protocol to Implement Ninth Package under AFAS (2015), Brunei has 
committed to open foreign equity participation up to 55% for integrated engineering 
services (transportation infrastructure turnkey services, water and sanitation supply 
works, construction of manufacturing turnkey projects and other turnkey projects, and 
various construction- and engineering-related services. It therefore reserves the right 
to maintain such maximum foreign equity requirement in its laws. 
 
Indonesia 
 
Infrastructure-related services are subject to a number of foreign investment 
restrictions. These include the following.143 
 
 
 Construction services (construction contractors) with simple and medium technology 
and/or small and medium risks and/or work value of up to  IDR 50,000,000.000 are 
reserved for SMEs. 
 
 Business  services  and  Construction  consultancy  services  “with  simple/medium 
technology and/or small/medium risks and/or value less than IDR 10,000,000,00” are 
reserved for SMEs. 
 
 Construction of electric power – maximum 95% foreign capital. 
 
 Construction  service  (construction  implementation  service)  using  advanced 
technology and/or high risk and/or the work value is more than IDR 50,000,000,000 
(CPC 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, and 518) and Business service / Construction 
consultant service using advanced technology and/or high risk and/or the work value 
is more than IDR 10,000,000,000 (CPC 8671, 8672, 8673, 8674, and 9403) 
 Foreign capital ownership: Max.67%. 
 Foreign capital ownership by ASEAN countries’ investors: Max.70%.  
 
 
 
  
                                                            
143  Presidential Regulation Number 44 Year 2016 Concerning Lists of Business Fields that are 
Closed to and Business Fields that are Open with Conditions to Investment, containing 
Indonesia’s Negative List. See also OECD, “Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and 
India 2016 – Enhancing Regional Ties”, p. 64, on impediments to infrastructure in Indonesia. 
43 
 
Thailand 
 
Thailand generally restricts foreign capital ownership in several important services to 
a maximum of 49%. Architectural, construction and engineering services – all relevant 
to infrastructure development - fall within this restriction category.144 
 
Viet Nam 
Foreign investment in six “conditional sectors” require approval and include maximum 
foreign capital ownership restrictions. 
Projects which require Prime Ministerial approval include those in telecommunication 
network infrastructures, broadcasting, provision of telecommunications and internet 
services, construction and operation of river ports, sea ports, airports, and 
transportation of goods and passengers by railway, airway, road, sea, inland waterway 
and projects having investment capital of more than VND5,000 billion (USD233 
million).145 
 
In late 2016, the Government proposed the removal of restrictions on a number of 
conditional sectors.146 In July 2017, the Vietnamese Prime Minister indicated an 
intention to remove investment restrictions in certain areas such as finance, banking 
and telecommunications services and this is therefore an important area to monitor.147 
 
Information on “conditional business activities” is to be set out in the National 
Enterprise Registration Portal, but at the time of access, the site was only available in 
Vietnamese.148 
 
 
                                                            
144  Foreign Business Act 1999 B.E. 2542, List 3, available at: http://library.siam-legal.com/thai-
law/foreign-business-act-types-of-businesses-list-3/ (accessed on 23 July 2017). These are 
subject to exemptions and to FTA liberalisation measures. In the case of construction services 
they are subject to the following specific exceptions:  
1. Construction of structures for delivery of infrastructure public services in the sphere of 
public utilities or transportation requiring the use of special apparatuses, machines, 
technology or expertise, with the minimum capital of five hundred million Baht or upwards 
from foreigners; 
2. Construction of other types as prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation. 
145  Law on Investment 2014, Law No. 67-2014-QH13, Appendix 4, and Decree 118/2015/ND-CP 
was issued on November 12th 2015; for unofficial English translations of the documents, see 
http://www.antlawyers.vn/library/law-on-investment-2014.html and 
http://www.antlawyers.vn/legal-service/decree-1182015nd-cp-guiding-the-investment-law-
2014.html (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
146  See “Ministry to Propose 67 Conditional Business Lines to be Permitted”, 9 September 2016, 
at: https://www.talkvietnam.org/2016/09/ministry-to-propose-67-conditional-business-lines-be-
permitted/ (accessed on 23 July 2017). The Government is also developing a website to list the 
restricted lines of business to increase transparency and facilitate investment. 
147  See report, “VN vows to lift restrictions to facilitate foreign investors: PM Phú”, Viet Nam News, 
11 July 2017, at http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/379891/vn-vows-to-lift-restrictions-to-
facilitate-foreign-investors-pm-phuc.html#iRhfVdL1jTPmhX7v.99 (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
148  See Portal at: https://dangkykinhdoanh.gov.vn/HelpAndSupport/tabid/93/ArticleID/291/Ho-
tro.aspx (accessed on 12 July 2017; English language icon not operational). 
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Infrastructure PPP Laws and Regulations 
 
While ASEAN has a set of PPP guidelines for member States,149 ASEAN domestic 
regulation on private-public partnership arrangements (PPP) is uneven for the reasons 
shown below. 
As at July 2017, most ASEAN member States have laws, 
regulations or at least guiding documents addressing PPP 
arrangements. 150 However, there appears to be a lack of clarity 
in some of these.151 
Apart from clear laws and regulations to allow foreign investors to participate 
confidently in PPP projects in ASEAN, the general regulatory environment, 
transparency of government procurement processes and the rule of law are important 
as well.152 
 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
The team recommends the following: 
 
 Accelerate liberalisation in a Priority Cluster of services (such as e-commerce, 
logistics, financial and infrastructure-related services) to allow ASEAN 
businesses to better participate in GVCs.153 
                                                            
149  See ASEAN, at: http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Public-Private-Partnership-in-South-East-
Asia.pdf. 
150  See ibid., Table 7. See country regulatory information in “National Public-Private Partnership 
Framework in ASEAN Member Countries”, ERIA, September 2015, at: 
http://www.eria.org/publications/research_project_reports/national-public-private-partnership-
framework-in-asean-member-countries.html (accessed on 23 July 2017). For an example of 
recent legislative action see Vietnam, 
http://www.mpi.gov.vn/en/Pages/tinbai.aspx?idTin=36970&idcm=133 (accessed on 23 July 
2017). Vietnam, for example, issued a specific Decree on PPP Investment Forms in 2015; see 
Decree No. 15/2015/ND-CP and related documents. 
151  See for example, Satoshi Shimizu, “Issues Affecting the Increased Use of Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) in Infrastructure Development in Asia”, Pacific Business and Industries 
Vol. XVI, 2016 No. 60, at pp. 15-16 and 20-21, available at: 
https://www.jri.co.jp/MediaLibrary/file/english/periodical/rim/2016/60.pdf (accessed on 23 July 
2017). See also http://www.bmiresearch.com/articles/asia-ppp-market-still-needing-
development and UNESCAP, at: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/1b%20-
%20WB%20-
%20Leveraging%20private%20finance%20through%20dvlpt%20banks%2C%20the%20Glob
al%20Infrastructure%20Facility%20%28GIF%29.pdf (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
152  See “Hand in Hand”, 3 September 2014, Southeast Asia Globe; http://sea-
globe.com/infrastructure-focus-asean/ (accessed on 23 July 2017). See also generally, See 
D.3, AEC Blueprint 2025, and Imelda Deinla, “The Development of the Rule of Law in ASEAN 
– The State and Regional Integration”, Cambridge University Press (2017), especially Chapters 
6 and 7. 
153  Note that Article 3(3)(g) of the ACIA allows ASEAN member States to add other sectors to the 
liberalisation plan of the ACIA. 
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 Facilitate investments in such a Priority Cluster. 
 Facilitate investments by AEOs and MSMEs. 
 Provide greater clarity in PPP laws, policies and implementation. 
 
 
E. Investment Facilitation and Regulatory Connectivity 
 
During the team’s Manila Roundtable, the investment facilitation programme under the 
ACIA was highlighted by a participant as being a useful platform to harmonise 
investment laws in ASEAN. 
 
The following summarises feedback from businesses gathered at the Ho Chi Minh City 
Roundtable, which points to a need for investment facilitation. 
 “Too many laws.” 
“Even Vietnamese lawyers have to constantly update themselves”; 
“Often, there are many matters that require consulting with the 
authorities even before submission of applications for clients. The 
answer is not written in any specific law – it is necessary to be guided 
by regulators. There are various regulators in Vietnam.” 
“There are too many conditional sectors.” 
While the ACIA contains language on investment facilitation and enhancing economic 
integration through investment-related initiatives, such language is weak as it is 
requires that member States “shall endeavour” to take certain steps.154 The contrast 
with the much more detailed and stronger provisions in the ATIGA for trade facilitation 
is marked.155 
 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
Two possible steps to advance investment facilitation are: 
 
 development of a parallel ASEAN framework and work programme for 
investment facilitation, drawing lessons from the framework and principles 
in ASEAN trade facilitation for trade in goods; and 
 
 sharing of best practices in investment regulation. This entails increasing 
regulatory connectivity among ASEAN regulators and law-makers who work 
                                                            
154  See Articles 25 and 26, ACIA. 
155  See Chapter 5, ATIGA. 
46 
 
in investment law-making. The ASEAN Guide on Good Regulatory Practice 
(GRP) is a good starting point. While it contains general and goods-related 
regulation practices, it does not address investment-specific regulation 
practices. 
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SECTION 4 LAND USE BARRIERS 
 
Overview  
 
As land is a limited, valuable resource, countries will seek to regulate the rights relating 
to the land situated in their territories. Restrictions on land rights are a means to many 
ends, including differentiating between protected and promoted sectors; ensuring 
sustainable exploitation of natural resources; and implementing environmental 
conservation policies. Unduly restrictive or unwieldy laws or processes on acquisition 
and protection of land rights will, however, make the country less competitive in 
attracting foreign direct investment. ASEAN member States must work on striking a 
balance between business facilitation and monitoring.  
 
The team extracted and compiled the relevant data from World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business Report (DB World Bank 2017)156 to provide a quick overview of the 
processes and systems relating to land rights acquisition and protection in ASEAN.   
 
Efficiency, Time and Costs of Property Registration  
 
Table 9 shows the general efficiency of ASEAN legal systems in property registration. 
On the ranking of 190 economies in respect of ease of registering property in the DB 
World Bank 2017,157 five ASEAN member States are placed in the lower half of the 
table: 
 
Table 9:  Efficiency of Legal System in Property Registration in ASEAN 
 
 
ASEAN Member States 
 
 
Rank 
 
No. of 
Procedures 
 
Time  
(Days) 
 
Cost (% of property 
value) 
 
Singapore  19  6  4.5  2.9 
Malaysia   40  8  13  3.4 
Vietnam  59  5  57.5  0.6 
Lao PDR  65  4  53  1 
Thailand  68  4  6  7.4 
Philippines  112  9  35  4.3 
Indonesia*  118  5  25  10.9 
Cambodia  120  7  56  4.3 
Brunei Darussalam  134  6  298  0.6 
Myanmar  143  6  85  5.1 
 
Source: Compiled from DB World Bank 2017  
*Indonesia has risen from rank 123 (DB 2016 Rank) to rank 118 (DB 2017 Rank) 
                                                            
156  Rankings are benchmarked to June 2016. 
157  http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (accessed on 23 June 2017).  
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Quality of Land Administration  
 
Chart 11 below shows the World Bank’s 2017 rating of the quality of the land 
administration in the different ASEAN member States. The quality index (0-30) is 
calculated based on the following considerations:  
 
(i) Reliability of infrastructure index; 
(ii) Transparency of information;  
(iii) Geographic coverage; 
(iv) Land dispute resolution; and  
(v) Equal access to property rights.  
 
Chart 11:  Quality of the Land Administration Index (0-30) 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled from DB World Bank 2017  
 
 
Digitisation and Electronic Databases  
 
Table 10 below extracts from DB World Bank 2017 information relating to the 
digitisation of title records and availability of electronic databases concerning land 
rights in ASEAN. The level of digitisation of the relevant information is key to organising 
an orderly land title record system as well as enabling/facilitating ready access to 
information concerning land rights and land development.  
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Table 10:  Digitisation of Title Records and Electronic Databases in ASEAN 
 
 
ASEAN Member 
State 
 
Majority of title 
records: paper or 
computerised? 
 
Electronic database 
for checking 
encumbrances? 
Electronic database 
for recording 
boundaries, checking 
plans and providing 
cadastral information? 
Singapore  Computer/fully 
digital 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
Malaysia   Computer/fully 
digital 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
 
Vietnam 
 
Computer/scanned 
 
 
✔ 
 
✔ 
Lao PDR  Paper  
 
✗  ✗ 
Thailand  Paper   ✗ 
 
✗ 
Philippines  Computer/scanned 
 
✗  ✗ 
Indonesia  Paper  
 
✗  ✔ 
Cambodia  Paper  
 
✗  ✗ 
Brunei Darussalam  Paper  
 
✗  ✔ 
Myanmar  Paper  
 
✗  ✗ 
Source: Compiled from DB World Bank 2017  
 
Transparency of Information relating to Acquisition of Rights  
 
Table 11 shows data compiled from DB World Bank 2017 relating to the availability of 
information concerning acquisition of land rights. The ease of obtaining such 
information makes acquisition of land rights less tedious and costly. It also boosts 
investors’ confidence in the transparency of the process.  
 
The data relates to the following questions considered by the DB World Bank 2017: 
 
(i) Who is able to obtain information on land ownership at the agency in charge 
of immovable property registration in the largest business city?  
(ii) Is the list of documents that are required to complete any property 
transaction made publicly available—and if so, how? 
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(iii) Is the applicable fee schedule for any property transaction at the agency in 
charge of immovable property registration in the largest business city made 
publicly available—and if so, how? 
 
Table 11:  Information relating to Land Ownership, List of Documents and Fees  
 
 
ASEAN Member 
State 
 
Who can obtain 
information on land 
ownership? 
 
Is list of documents 
required to complete 
any property transaction 
publicly available? 
Is the fee schedule for 
any property 
transaction made 
publicly available?  
 
Singapore 
Anyone who pays 
the official fee 
✔ 
Online  
 
✔ 
Online 
 
Malaysia  
Anyone who pays 
the official fee 
✔ 
Online 
 
✔ 
Online  
 
Vietnam 
Anyone who pays 
the official fee  
✔ 
On public records 
 
✔ 
On public records 
 
Lao PDR 
Only intermediaries 
and interested 
parties  
 
✔ 
In person 
✔ 
On public records 
 
Thailand 
Only intermediaries 
and interested 
parties  
 
✔ 
Online  
 
✔ 
Online  
 
 
Philippines 
Anyone who pays 
the official fee 
✔ 
Online 
 
✔ 
Online 
 
 
Indonesia 
Anyone who pays 
the official fee 
 
✔ 
Online  
 
✔ 
Online  
 
 
Cambodia 
Only intermediaries 
and interested 
parties 
 
✔ 
In person 
✔ 
Online 
 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
Anyone who pays 
the official fee 
 
✔ 
Online 
 
✔ 
In person  
 
Myanmar 
Anyone who pays 
the official fee 
 
✔ 
Online  
 
 
✗ 
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Source: Compiled from DB World Bank 2017  
 
Survey Findings   
 
In this segment of the survey, respondents were asked a series of questions to help 
us understand the kind of obstacles they encountered in respect of acquisition of   land 
rights158 in the ASEAN countries.  Of the total completed survey responses received, 
only five respondents indicated that they have encountered obstacles in the acquisition 
of land rights in ASEAN countries.  
 
These five respondents operate in a wide range of industries.159 Of the five, only four 
respondents expressly indicated that they have acquired interests or rights in land in 
one or more of the ASEAN member States. The remaining respondent did not give 
any indication but proceeded to answer other questions.  
 
Barriers Encountered relating to Acquisition of Land Rights 
 
A key question in the survey asked the respondents to identify the barriers that they 
experienced at the stage of acquiring land rights, by choosing from a fixed list of 
responses (see barriers set out in Table 12 below).  
 
The respondents were then asked to rate the level of difficulty, on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 
being the most difficult), for each barrier encountered. By way of an overview, the five 
respondents, between them and not by any one alone, have encountered all the 
barriers set out below. 
 
Table 12:  Barriers Encountered relating to the Acquisition of Land Rights 
 
Barriers  Mean difficulty level (0‐
5) 
Legal restriction on duration 
 
3.75 
Legal restriction on size of land 
 
2.6664 
Legal restriction on direct acquisition of the land rights by 
a foreign company  
 
3.6667 
Unclear laws/policies on the acquisition of land rights 
 
3.6667 
Absence of or lack of access to the governments’ master 
plan and/or policies on land use and development  
 
3.3334 
                                                            
158  Including land ownership, leasehold interest and other land use rights.  
159  Including power and renewables, oil and gas, education, infrastructure, telecommunications, 
healthcare, financial services, information technology, customer services and consultancy. 
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Absence of or lack of access to a centralised and reliable 
register  or  database  on  land  titles  and  other  parties’ 
existing land rights 
 
3.6663 
Intermediary/middle men issues  3 
 
Impact of legal obstacles on financing issues  2.3331 
 
 
One respondent provided qualitative observations on the barriers encountered.  
 
Barriers  Observations 
Legal  restriction on direct  acquisition of  the 
land rights by a foreign company  
 
Restriction  on  foreign  ownership  in 
Myanmar  and  Indonesia  is 
“problematic  for  large  scale 
industrial  real  estate  investment” 
and such a legal hurdle in turn results 
in  prevalent  workarounds  that  are 
“problematic”.160  
 
Absence  of  or  lack  of  access  to  the 
governments’ master plan and/or policies on 
land use and development  
 
The  government’s  master  plan 
and/or  policies  for  land  use  and 
development  is  “critical  to  investor 
due  diligence”  but  these  are  not 
available  in  “several  developing 
markets”.161  
 
 
Post-acquisition Barriers  
 
Three respondents indicated that they encountered further barriers post-acquisition of 
the land rights. They were asked to identify the barriers encountered from a fixed list: 
 
(i) Government compulsory acquisition  
(ii) Land use/zoning issues  
(iii) Issues in relation to transfer to another party  
(iv) Others 
 
                                                            
160  The respondent did not go on to explain what these workarounds are and in what ways they 
are problematic.  
161  The respondent did not go on to identify these developing markets. However, the respondent 
indicated in its survey response that it acquired land rights in Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar and 
Indonesia.  
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Two respondents indicated that they encountered obstacles (i) to (iii); one respondent 
indicated that it encountered all obstacles but the difficulty level was rated to be of the 
minimum level.  
 
Existing Literature / Reports 
 
This part of the report summarises the barriers identified in existing literature and 
reports. The survey responses reflect some of these barriers.  
 
The barriers highlighted below are primarily for illustrative and indicative purposes. 
They are not meant to be a comprehensive and authoritative summary of the current 
state of law on land rights in the respective ASEAN countries. If no references are 
made to the existence of particular barriers in certain countries, it does not necessarily 
follow that no such barriers exist. 
 
 
(i) Cumbersome and Costly Processes  
 
Cambodia  
 
The Cambodian land title system has been described as “cumbersome, expensive, 
and subject to corruption”, notwithstanding the Cambodian government’s efforts to 
speed up the issuance of titles.162 
 
Indonesia  
 
The cost of land permits is high.163 Secondly, the process for obtaining these permits 
is described to be “arduous”.164  The infrastructure development in Indonesia is also 
reported to suffer from “the lack of a solid land-acquisition framework”.165 
 
 
  
                                                            
162   See 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254269 (accessed on 22 June 2017). The 2001 Land Law establishes a system for 
recording titles and ownership in land. 
163  See “The ASEAN Advantage: Exploring Canada’s Trade Potential” (2016) p 44, a joint report 
by The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, the Canada-ASEAN Business Council, the Business 
Council of Canada, and the University of British Columbia. The issue of high cost has also been 
noted recently in Sindi Paramita, “Analysis: Obstacles in Indonesian property sector” The 
Jakarta Post (20 July 2016): http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/20/analysis-
obstacles-indonesian-property-sector.html (accessed on 23 July 2017). According to this 
commentary, “[i]nvestors have found it hard to obtain a plot of land ready for development at a 
reasonable price and this has triggered high costs in project development”. 
164  The ASEAN Advantage Report 2016, p. 44. 
165 Investment Climate Statements for 2016 – Indonesia: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254281 (accessed on 22 June 2017).  
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Philippines  
 
The property registration process has been described as “tedious and costly”.166  
 
(ii) Inadequate Title Record Management  
 
Philippines  
 
The title record management is described as “weak” as a result of insufficient funding 
and lack of trained personnel. 167  
 
(iii) Uncertainty of Land Rights 
 
A number of factors can contribute to the uncertainty in land rights. In ASEAN 
countries, instances of land acquisition have led to disputes involving local farmers. 
Inadequate title record system and non-standardisation of proof of title are other 
factors affecting the certainty of land rights. 
 
Cambodia  
 
The “Investment Climate Statements 2016 – Cambodia” notes that land rights are “a 
contentious issue” in Cambodia, in part owing to the fact that most land rights holders 
do not have the relevant legal documentation of their rights as a result of the official 
policies and social upheaval during the era that the Khmer Rouge was in power.168 
Even though there is now a land title record system established under the 2001 Land 
Law, title records are not issued efficiently. Further, even where there is title record, it 
did not appear to satisfy judges in some court cases, and additional proof was 
demanded of the rights holders. Standardisation in title recognition is thus a matter 
that needs to be addressed under Cambodian law. 
 
Indonesia  
 
It has recently reported that investors are of the view that land ownership under 
Indonesian law is uncertain—there have been cases where land ownership held for 
years has come under challenge in litigation.169 
 
                                                            
166 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254309 (accessed on 23 June 2017).  
167 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254309 (accessed on 23 June 2017).  
168 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254269 (accessed on 22 June 2017). 
169  Sindi Paramita, “Analysis: Obstacles in Indonesian property sector” The Jakarta Post (20 July 
2016): http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/20/analysis-obstacles-indonesian-
property-sector.html (accessed on 23 July 2017). 
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Myanmar 
 
In respect of Myanmar, the ASEAN Investment Report 2017170 comments that there 
is a need to make “legal changes to land laws to give farmers secure rights to their 
land and the ability for them to choose which crops they grow”.171 
 
Lao PDR  
 
In Lao PDR, it is observed that beyond urban areas, rights to land are unclear and 
made complex by the continuing practice of communal titling in some areas.172 In fact, 
the government’s efforts in changing existing land policy has been impeded by 
“sensitive issues including community-held land rights, traditional land rights, slash-
and-burn or “shifting cultivation,” and a history of expropriation for infrastructure, 
mining, and power projects”.173 
 
Thailand  
 
The “Investment Climate Statements 2016 – Thailand” notes that the US Embassy in 
Thailand received reports of “conflicts over land title authenticity in areas that the 
government has designated as national park land”.174 
 
  
                                                            
170        The ASEAN Investment Report 2017, available at: http://asean.org/storage/2017/01/Investing-
in-ASEAN-2017-.pdf (accessed on 22 June 2017). 
171  The ASEAN Investment Report 2017, p. 77. The problem arises in part owing to the fact that 
laws in Myanmar are unclear or difficult to access: see generally J Beyer “Finding the Law in 
Myanmar” (2015) 31 Anthropology Today 3. 
172 The “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Lao PDR”: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254291 (accessed on 23 June 2017). Regarding communal tiltling, see more generally Ian G 
Baird, “‘Indigenous Peoples’ and land: Comparing communal land titling and its implications in 
Cambodia and Laos” (2013) 54 Asia Pacific Viewpoint 269. Regarding conflicts between 
indigenous people and investors, see, for example,  Chris Hufstader, “Defending Land and Life 
in Cambodia” (23 May 2016): https://closeup.oxfamamerica.org/stories/defending-land-and-
life-cambodia. 
173  The “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Lao PDR”: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254291 (accessed on 23 June 2017). 
174   https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm#wrapper  
(accessed on 22 June 2017). 
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(iv) Restriction on Ownership, Transfer of Rights and Extension of Licences 
 
Brunei Darussalam  
 
In Brunei, there are complaints of non-transparency of the Brunei Land Department’s 
policies and the general difficulties of transferring land even amongst Brunei 
citizens.175 Under the laws of Brunei Darussalam, foreigners are not allowed to own 
land and can only acquire long-term leases. The prevalent workaround appears to 
have been to conduct proxy land sales to foreigners through the use of powers of 
attorney and trust deeds.176 However, amendments to the Brunei Land Code have 
been introduced in 2016 to ban such proxy land sales and convert existing land 
ownership through powers of attorney and trust deeds into 60-year leases.177 
 
Viet Nam  
 
Under Vietnamese law, the Housing Law 2014 and the Real Estate Business Law 
2014,178 which took effect on 1 July 2015, introduced landmark reforms to the “land 
use rights” that foreign investors may acquire.179 Nevertheless, it was noted in the 
“Investment Climate Statements for 2016 — Vietnam” that investors continue to 
encounter other barriers. For instance, they found it difficult to amend investment 
licenses to expand their business operations onto neighbouring land. It was also 
observed that local authorities “may intend to” increase the renewal requirements for 
land use rights, especially in cases where there are Vietnamese competitors in the 
relevant sector.180    
 
  
                                                            
175  The Report: Brunei Darussalam 2013, p 198. It is noted that “it can take several years to obtain 
notification from the Land Department as to whether or not a property transfer may take place”. 
176  The “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Brunei Darussalam”: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2017&dlid
=269801 (accessed on 25 July 2017). See also The Report: Brunei Darussalam 2013, p 198. 
177 See the Land Code (Amendment) Order, 2016: 
http://www.agc.gov.bn/AGC%20Images/LAWS/Gazette_PDF/2016/EN/S037.pdf (accessed 
23 June 2017). See also the “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Brunei Darussalam”: 
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm#wrapper 
(accessed on 23 June 2017); The Report: Brunei Darussalam 2014, p 142. 
178  http://vietnamlawenglish.blogspot.sg/2014/11/vietnam-real-estate-trading-law-2014.html 
(accessed on 22 June 2017). 
179  See commentary: http://www.vilaf.com.vn/en/news-a-legal-updates/news/391-vietnams-new-
law-on-housing.html (accessed on 23 June 2017). 
180 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254329 (accessed on 23 June 2017) 
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(v) Inefficient / Ineffective Resolution of Land Disputes  
 
Cambodia  
 
There are sentiments that the Cambodian government has not “effectively and fairly 
resolved land rights claims” arising out of the grant of economic land concessions 
under Cambodian law.181 
 
Myanmar 
 
The fears of land battles also resonate with investors and potential investors in the 
Myanmar economy. It is reported in the Financial Times that land battles, including 
land-grabbing and disputes in ownership,182 constitute “one of the most significant 
risks identified by businesses coming in”.183 
 
Philippines  
 
In Philippines, it has been observed that “[c]orruption is…prevalent among land 
administration personnel and the court system is slow to resolve land disputes”.184 
 
Viet Nam 
 
It has been noted that there are “many outstanding legal disputes between land 
owners and local authorities” and foreign investors may become exposed to these 
disputes when they acquire shareholding in a local company.185 
 
 
(vi) Uncertain Compulsory Acquisition Laws and Processes 
 
In this part, compulsory acquisition laws are considered from the perspective of 
protecting foreign investors’ investments. Whilst compulsory acquisition laws are a 
                                                            
 181 See the “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Cambodia”: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254269 (accessed on 22 June 2017).  
182  These problems arise as a result of the introduction of land policy reforms without consulting 
the wider society (including the farmers) or taking into account customary land use practices. 
See Stephen McCarthy, “Land Tenure Security and Policy Tensions in Myanmar (Burma)” Asia 
Pacific Issues No 127 (October 2016): http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/land-tenure-
security-and-policy-tensions-in-myanmar-burma (accessed on 23 June 2017). 
183  Michael Peel, “The Great Land Rush—Myanmar: The Dispossessed”, Financial Times (1 March 
2016): https://ig.ft.com/sites/land-rush-investment/myanmar/?mhq5j=e1 (accessed on 23 June 
2017). See also Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business Briefing Paper—Land (March 
2015): http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/2015-04-02-LAND-Briefing.pdf 
(accessed on 23 June 2017). 
184 See the “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Philippines”: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254309 (accessed on 23 June 2017). 
185 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254329 (accessed on 23 June 2017) 
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necessary feature of the laws of any country, acquisition without fair and reasonable 
compensation, uncertain laws or the lack of a grievance procedure can cause foreign 
investors to lose confidence.  
 
Lao PDR  
 
Although there are laws protecting foreign assets and investments against 
expropriation save where it is necessary for a public purpose,186 the term “public 
purpose” can be widely defined.187 The “Investment Climate Statements for 2016 — 
Laos” notes that “[s]mall landholdings, land with unclear title, or land on which tax has 
not been paid is particularly at risk to expropriation”.188 
 
Philippines  
 
The expropriation of land for public use in Philippines is contentious owing to uncertain 
laws and protracted judicial processes.189 Although the laws of Philippines prescribe 
for compensation to foreign investors in the case of expropriation of property by the 
State for public use, in practice, it is observed that the process of arriving at a mutually 
agreeable price can be long-drawn in the Philippine courts.190 The Philippine 
government passed the Republic Act No 10752 (also known as the “Right-of-Way 
Act”)191 on 7 March 2016 to facilitate the acquisition of right-of-way sites for state 
infrastructure projects.192 In particular, it lays down procedures (including court time 
lines where judicial proceedings are necessary193) for payment of “just compensation” 
to land owners whose property has been expropriated. It remains to be seen if the 
legislation can effectively resolve the existing problems.   
 
                                                            
186       See http://www.laolandissues.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Full-Policy-Recommendations-
Eng4.pdf (accessed on 23 June 2017). This report is produced by the Land Issues Working 
Group, a non-governmental organisation: http://www.laolandinfo.org/about-us-2/who-we-are-2/ 
(accessed on 23 June 2017). 
187  See “Supporting Rationale for LIWG Recommendation: Defining standards for public purpose” 
Report, a copy is available here: http://www.laolandissues.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Standard-of-Public-Purpose-–-Rationale-for-Laos-and-International-
Examples.-LIWG-2014.pdf (Accessed on 23 June 2017). 
188 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254291 (accessed on 23 June 2017). 
189  Raula J Palabrica, “New Expropriation Law” Philippine Daily Inquirer (21 March 2016): 
http://business.inquirer.net/208827/new-expropriation-law (accessed on 23 June 2017).  
190  See the “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Philippines”, see: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254309 (accessed on 23 June 2017).  
191  http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2016/03/07/republic-act-no-10752/  (accessed on 23 June 
2017). 
192  For details, see description in Raula J Palabrica, “New Expropriation Law” Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (21 March 2016): http://business.inquirer.net/208827/new-expropriation-law (accessed 
on 23 June 2017). 
193  Section 6(3)(f) of the Republic Act No 10752 states that “[i]n the event that the owner of the 
property contests the implementing agency’s proffered value, the court shall determine the just 
compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the 
expropriation case”.  
59 
 
Viet Nam  
 
In Viet Nam, Article 5 of the Housing Law 2014 lays down the circumstances in which 
the State may purchase, commandeer or demolish housing on conditions of payment 
of compensation and implement policies for relocation of homeowners.194 One such 
circumstance is where the land would be necessary for “socio-economic development” 
but it has been said that the term is “loosely-defined”.195  
 
 
(vii) Infrastructure-related Barriers 
 
There have been complaints of inadequate infrastructure support for the development 
of sectors such as manufacturing. For example, the “The ASEAN Advantage: 
Exploring Canada’s Trade Potential” Report observed generally that a major barrier to 
the development of ASEAN manufacturing sector is “inefficiencies caused by poor 
infrastructure, including ports, roads, and rail networks”.196 The report proposes the 
creation of special manufacturing zones with improved access (legal, administrative 
and technical) to invigorate regional trade in manufactured goods.197 
 
Indonesia  
 
The rate of land acquisition for infrastructure projects has been described as “slow”.198 
There has been some improvement to the system nevertheless: 
 
“The Law on Land Acquisition Procedures for Public Interest Development 
passed in December 2011 sought to streamline GOI acquisition of land for much-
needed infrastructure projects. The law seeks to clarify roles, reduce the time 
frame for each phase of the land acquisition process, deter land speculation, and 
curtail obstructionist litigation, while still ensuring safeguards for land-right 
holders. The implementing regulations, first approved in 2012, went into effect on 
January 1, 2015; further revisions in 2015 expanded the scope of the new 
                                                            
194   http://vietnamlawenglish.blogspot.sg/2014/11/vietnam-housing-law-2014.html (accessed on 
23 June 2017). 
195 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254329 (accessed on 23 June 2017) 
196  See “The ASEAN Advantage: Exploring Canada’s Trade Potential” (2016) p 47, a joint report 
by The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, the Canada-ASEAN Business Council, the Business 
Council of Canada, and the University of British Columbia. See also Section 3 on Infrastructure 
Services Restrictions. 
197  In Vietnam, many foreign investors consider it easier to implement investment projects in free 
trade zones because "they do not have to be involved in site clearance and infrastructure 
construction”. See  See the “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Vietnam”: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254329 (accessed on 17 July 2017). 
198 See the “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Indonesia”, see: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254281 (accessed on 17 July 2017).  
60 
 
provisions. Some reports indicate that the law has reduced land acquisition 
timelines; with no accusations of illegal GOI expropriation of land.”199 
 
Lao PDR  
 
Poor transportation infrastructure has been noted to be a factor in slowing the growth 
and expansion of trade in Laos.200 
 
Roundtable Findings  
 
Feedback from Bangkok Roundtable  
 
The following observations were made at the team’s Bangkok Roundtable. 
Access to land use planning information  
Difficult to access land use planning information.  
Land use planning is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Interior. A search on the internet, however, did not show 
that the Ministry of Interior has an official website. Nor 
does it appear that current land use planning information 
is available online.  
In practice, investors will do best to seek help from the 
Board of Investment (“BOI”).201 
 
Feedback from Ho Chi Minh City Roundtable 
 
The following feedback was gathered at the team’s Ho Chi Minh City Roundtable. 
 
Industrial zones: 
Industrial zones / industrial parks have ecosystems in 
place to assist investors to get set up and running right 
away. Licensing requirements are centralised through 
management boards, making it very convenient. 
                                                            
199  See the “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Indonesia”, see: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254281 (accessed on 17 July 2017). “GOI” refers to the Government of Indonesia. 
200 See the “Investment Climate Statements 2016—Lao PDR”, see: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?year=2016&dlid
=254291 (accessed on 17 July 2017). 
201   http://www.boi.go.th/index.php?page=index (accessed on 23 June 2017). 
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Indirect expropriation:  
In respect of investment, in all the Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, the Vietnamese government has committed to 
nationalise or expropriate investments in accordance with 
international standards.  
The problem is indirect expropriation – very unclear 
concept. 
Rate of compensation for expropriated land: 
One important question for investors is land compensation 
for current residents on the land which investors intend to 
acquire land use rights. 
The amount of compensation is dependent on negotiations 
with residents – general practice is to refer to market rate 
or the (non-binding) rates published by the government 
annually for public reference. 
 
 
Preliminary Recommendations  
 
Based on the team’s preliminary findings set out above, there are three areas where 
ASEAN member States can work on: 
 
 Enhancing access to information concerning acquisition of land rights;  
 Establishing a uniform land titling system to enhance certainty and security 
of rights; and  
 Clarifying and strengthening compulsory acquisition laws and processes. 
 
In relation to the areas identified, ASEAN member States with more advanced systems 
can work with other States to achieve greater consistency in systems, processes and 
standards across ASEAN.  
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The team’s recommendations for each of the three areas are set out below: 
 
Enhancing access to information relating to land  
 
 Introduce electronic databases for checking land ownership, encumbrances as 
well as boundaries and zoning matters. These databases should be made 
available online and accessible to anyone paying a fee. 
 All procedures and fee schedules for conducting any type of property 
transaction should be available online for public access.  
 Work towards an ASEAN portal for a consolidated database of the above 
information.  
 
Establishing uniform land titling system and improving governance  
 
 Accelerate systematic electronic land titling system;  
 Put in place an efficient dispute resolution mechanism to resolve long running 
land rights disputes;  
 Set up a taskforce to study non-communal land rights and communal land 
rights; and  
 Provide education and training for government officers in charge of issuing land 
titles.  
 
Clarifying compulsory acquisition laws and processes 
 
 Clarify the meaning of key terms, and measures of compensation; 
 Establish grievance procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms; and 
 Set up an ASEAN working group to study best practices on compulsory 
acquisition laws and processes.  
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SECTION 5 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BARRIERS 
 
Time, Costs and Quality of Judicial Processes 
 
Business costs can be exacerbated by legal processes encountered when dealing 
with disputes and enforcement of contracts. A number of factors affects the 
experiences – and costs incurred – when businesses seek to settle their disputes. 
 
The time taken to enforce contracts and costs of such enforcement to claimants are 
factors which are relevant to businesses in ASEAN. 
 
Charts 12 and 13 compare the time and costs of contract enforcement processes in 
ASEAN. 
 
Chart 12: Time to Enforce Contracts (Days) 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2017 data) 
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Chart 13: Costs of Enforcement (% of Claim) 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016 data) 
 
 
Judicial systems can contribute to business costs. As one study put it: 
 
“The channels through which judicial decisions may affect business behaviour 
are fairly straightforward and may be reduced to two: increased uncertainty and 
high costs.”202 
 
The study also explained that the performance of the Philippines judicial system had 
been “thrown into the limelight as the business sector has in various surveys pointed 
to its performance as being one of the main obstacles and disincentives to doing 
business in the Philippines”203 and that high costs eat into businesses’ profitability.204 
 
Businesses have a choice of resolving their disputes through litigation or other means. 
Where cross-border issues are involved parties may resort to methods such as 
arbitration and mediation, where they may prefer to settle disputes away from a 
particular court system. 
 
  
                                                            
202  Sereno M. L. & Dios E. S. & Capuno J.J., “Justice and the Cost of Doing Business: The 
Philippines”, (2009) XLVI No. 1, The Philippine Review of Economics, pp. 35-86, at p. 36. 
203  Ibid. 
204  Ibid., p. 37. See also the discussion of Philippine courts and recommendations in Arangkada 
Philippines 2010: A Business Perspective, December 2010, pp. 297-306. 
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Choice of Dispute Resolution Methods 
 
Preliminary Findings 
 
Based on the team’s survey, efficiency and costs were the two top factors which 
respondents selected for their preferred dispute settlement methods. The preferences 
were also found not to have changed over the past 10 years for 100% of respondents. 
 
The survey posed the following question:  
“If your company has had any contract-related disputes in the past five years, what 
proportion involved only parties within ASEAN?” 
 
63.64% of respondents had less than 50% of such disputes, suggesting that the 
majority of such disputes involved at least one non-ASEAN party. 
 
On the other hand, 57.14% of 14 respondents did not always include an arbitration 
clause in their contracts.  
 
Among other questions on dispute resolution, the survey asked respondents whether 
there was any new body, legal procedure or database which they would like to see in 
ASEAN that could better facilitate their business operations and/or expansion in the 
region.  
 
75% of respondents replied in the negative. 
 
For those who replied in the affirmative, the further question posed was what type of 
database or body might be most useful. The responses are shown below. 
ENGLISH DATABASE OF ALL ASEAN LAWS 
Singled customs window; unified regulatory database 
Central statistics organisation 
The survey posed the following question, regarding an ASEAN-wide dispute resolution 
body: “Would your company find it useful to have an ASEAN dispute resolution 
structure which specialises in hearing contract disputes between ASEAN 
businesses?” 
 
57.14% answered “No”, with the following reasons being provided: 
 
We are an FI – we used the courts to enforce* 
We deal mainly with our local representatives. 
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We don’t have many cases that would elecate (sic: elevate) to this 
point 
SG is fine 
All services in Singapore and SMC** can cater for our arbitration 
issues 
*FI – Financial Institution 
** Presumably this refers to the Singapore Mediation Centre 
 
For those who answered “Yes”, the following reasons were provided: 
Although using services already available in Singapore would 
suffice. 
One forum for ASEAN 
Similar to Singapore International Commercial Court 
It appears from the above responses that a majority of respondents saw no need 
for any new ASEAN-wide dispute resolution structure.  
 
Roundtable and other Findings 
 
Based on the team’s discussions, existing literature and reports, an unfamiliarity with 
international enforcement treaties and international arbitration law norms has been 
observed in certain systems. 
 
 
Philippines 
 
Feedback from Manila Roundtable 
 
Participants shared the following views with the team. 
While the Philippines Supreme Court had ‘promulgated’ specific rules 
on arbitration,205 it was observed that more judicial support for 
international arbitration was necessary. 
Greater familiarity with international conventions such as the New 
York Convention was expressed as being important. 
  
                                                            
205  The research team followed up with research and found these in Supreme Court En Banc, A.M. 
No. 07-11-08-SC dated 1 September 2009. 
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Thailand 
 
Feedback from Bangkok Roundtable 
Thailand is not a signatory to any treaty on enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  
Enforcement of a foreign judgment in Thai Courts is “very difficult”. In 
practice the courts may also not be sure on how to deal with foreign 
judgments. 
For arbitral awards subject to the NYC, the public policy ground is 
“frequently invoked” to set aside such awards. It seems that the public 
policy ground is given wide interpretation in Thailand. 
Thailand intends to consider the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Courts Agreement but it is “not likely to sign it in the near future”. 
A perception of lack of support for arbitration and enforcement of arbitration awards 
has been expressed by some private-sector parties with respect to Thai courts.206  
 
The lack of enforceability of foreign judgments in Thai courts was confirmed in the 
Bangkok Roundtable. In addition, it was observed that there was uncertainty in the 
enforcement of arbitration awards due to references to the ground of public policy. 
 
Vietnam 
 
Feedback from Ho Chi Minh City Roundtable 
 
While Vietnam is a signatory to the NYC, Vietnamese judges may not 
be trained to handle enforcement cases related to the NYC. 
 
Very few Vietnamese judges speak English.  
 
There also appear to be NYC cases which have been reviewed by 
Vietnamese judges on their merits. 
 
                                                            
206  See for example, the practitioner views represented in “Thailand, Towards an Arbitration-
Friendlier Jurisdiction?” (which refer to a case in which the Thai Intellectual Property and Trade 
Court enforced a New York Convention award in 2013), 8 January 2014, at: 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=162fab61-b01a-4428-9ddf-c13a35c235cb. 
Enforcement of arbitral awards is covered by the Thai Arbitration Act B.E. 2545 (2002). 
68 
 
There appears to a case in which a SOE party in an arbitration sued 
the arbitrator for damages and the (foreign) arbitrator is very 
concerned as to whether he should travel to Vietnam.207 
 
Some present were not aware of the Hague Convention on Choice of 
Courts Agreement. 
 
Lao PDR 
 
The team found that in Lao PDR, it was relatively uncommon for businesses to use 
the courts to resolve their disputes. While businesses had expressed interest to hold 
arbitrations to resolve commercial disputes it appears that this is not necessarily 
available.208 
 
 
Language and Contract Enforcement Issues 
 
Indonesia 
 
In PT Bangun Karya Pretama Lestari v Nine AM, the Indonesia Supreme Court 
affirmed a decision of the West Jakarta District Court, holding that for a contract to be 
enforceable under Indonesian law it must be in the Indonesian language. It applied 
Article 31 of the Law No. 24 of 2009 regarding National Flag, Language, Emblem and 
Anthem of Indonesia.209 
 
Viet Nam 
 
In Viet Nam, certain laws require contracts to be in Vietnamese. In addition, the 2015 
Civil Procedure Code requires civil court proceedings to be conducted in Vietnamese 
                                                            
207  The research team followed up and confirmed that there is no arbitrator immunity under 
Vietnamese law: Art. 49(5) of the Law on Commercial Arbitration, No: 54-2010-QH12, provides 
as follows:   
If an arbitration tribunal orders a different form of interim relief or interim relief which 
exceeds the scope of the application by the applicant, thereby causing loss to the 
applicant or to the Party against whom the interim relief was applied or to a third Party, 
then the Party incurring loss shall have the right to institute court Proceedings for 
compensation in accordance with the law on civil Proceedings. 
See also K Minh Dang, Do Khoi Nguyen, Ian Fisher and Luan Tran, “Commercial Arbitration 
2017 - Vietnam”, para. 22, Glob. Arb. Rev., 27 June 2017, at  
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/jurisdiction/1004478/vietnam.  
 “SOE” refers to state-owned enterprise. 
208  Discussion by the team with a Lao PDR business chamber representative; notes of discussion 
on record kept by the team. 
209  Supreme Court decision 601K/PDT/2015 dated 31 August 2015. See 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e2317dde-6fb4-4ece-a56b-8d51a8b62a25, 
http://www.hfw.com/Indonesian-language-in-contracts-November-2013, and 
http://blog.ssek.com/index.php/2014/01/court-annuls-loan-agreement-on-language-law-what-
does-it-mean-for-your-agreements/. 
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and evidentiary documents in foreign languages to be translated into Vietnamese, with 
notarisation or authentication.210 
 
Cambodia 
 
Under the Cambodian Code of Civil Procedure, the official language of the Cambodian 
courts is Khmer. This means that official judgments will not be available in, for 
example, English. 
 
 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
The team recommends the following as steps towards increasing judicial connectivity 
in ASEAN. 
 
a) Increase judicial connectivity and dialogue at all levels of courts in ASEAN on 
international law norms, cross-border trade issues, international arbitration law, 
international instruments on enforcement of cross-border judgments and 
arbitration awards;211 and 
b) Wherever possible, publication of commercial law judgments of member States’ 
highest appellate courts in English, with online access. 
 
  
                                                            
210  See Art. 20 and Art. 96.3 of the Law No. 91/2015/QH13. See http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-
laws/talking-law/298184/foreign-language-contract-laws-vary-in-
vn.html#R9DM5WZOHq7uZ3iB.97. A participant in the team’s Manila Roundtable also 
expressed the view that the use of Vietnamese language for documents poses a barrier when 
due diligence activities have to be conducted by investors. 
211  There are existing judicial exchange and capacity-building initiatives in ASEAN which may be 
built upon. 
70 
 
SECTION 6 SUMMARY OF KEY INTERIM FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Corporate Barriers 
 
Interim findings 
 
The following are major concerns raised by businesses in starting up and in continuing 
obligations in ASEAN: 
 
(i) Complexity of procedures 
(ii) Equity restrictions 
(iii) Disparity of laws and procedures across ASEAN 
 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
 
 
  
Simplification of administrative processes
• For member States that require physical submission of documents for
incorporation applications, to consider making the necessary forms available
electronically; and to move towards enabling fully electronic submission of
incorporation documents (including enabling online payment of the necessary
fees).
• Work towards a fast-track process for the incorporation of a company by any
member State citizen or entity registered in a member State wishing to invest
in another member State.
Foreign equity restrictions
• Consider whether there are areas in which foreign equity limits may be lifted
for investing parties which are registered in an ASEAN member. state or who
are citizens of an ASEAN member state.
Harmonisation
• Consider the feasibility of common registration requirements (including the
possibility of basic incorporation forms that are common across ASEAN
member States.
• Establish a searchable online registry of companies registered in ASEAN
member States.
• Establish a searchable online sub-directory of MSMEs registered in ASEAN
member States
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Trade and Investment Barriers 
 
Interim Findings 
 
The research shows that: 
 there has been incomplete ratification and implementation of treaty 
commitments; 
 NTMs continue to pose concerns to businesses; 
 international trade facilitation tools are not being fully leveraged; 
 certain ASEAN trade facilitation actions can be prioritised and streamlined with 
meeting TFA requirements. 
 average release times of goods are not available throughout ASEAN. 
 priority sectors for services liberalisation are not aligned to with the Priority 
Integration sectors for goods, and are not best addressing GVC needs. 
 in some instances, businesses have to deal with multiple agencies and multiple 
regulations, for example when obtaining approvals, or for compliance purposes. 
This suggests a need for greater attention to be paid to improving regulatory 
efficiency and regulatory interfaces with the business community, both in relation 
to both trade and investment. 
 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
Trade Barriers 
 
 
Existing agreements
• Implementation of existing agreements.
• Rollback and standstill of NTMs in Priority Integration Sectors.
• Rollback and standstill of restrictions for services in Priority Integration
Sectors.
Trade Facilitation
• Align trade facilitation actions with WTO TFA.
• Accelerate trade facilitation under the TFA and where possible, ahead of TFA
implementation periods.
• Establish AEO systems in all member States.
• Implement trade facilitation for AEOs, and for MSMEs.
Customs Information
• Establish and publish average release times of goods.
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Investment Barriers 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory Issues 
 
 
 
  
Investment Liberalisation
• Accelerate liberalisation in a Priority Cluster of services (such as e-commerce,
logistics, financial and infrastructure-related services) for ASEAN businesses
to better participate in GVCs.
Investment Facilitation
• Facilitate investment in a Priority Cluster of services (such as e-commerce,
logistics, financial and infrastructure-related services).
• Facilitate investments by AEOs and MSMEs.
• Develop an investment facilitation framework equivalent to the trade facilitation
framework in ATIGA.
• Provide greater clarity in PPP laws, policies and implementation.
Regulatory Connectivity
• Extend the ASEAN Guide on Good Regulatory Practice to include investment-
specific regulatory good practices.
• Sharing of best practices in investment regulation.
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Land Use Barriers 
 
Interim Findings 
 
The research shows that the land rights systems in the different ASEAN member 
States are at different stages of development. Whilst efforts have been made in 
various member States to improve their systems, more can be done to: enhance 
access to information relating to land; establish a uniform land titling system and 
improve on its governance; and clarify compulsory acquisition laws and processes. 
This ultimate aim is to achieve certainty, clarity and a greater degree of consistency in 
land rights systems across the different member States. 
 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
 
 
 
Enhancing Access to Information relating to Land 
• Introduce electronic databases for checking land ownership, encumbrances as 
well as boundaries and zoning matters. These databases should be made 
available online and accessible to anyone paying a fee.
• All procedures and fee schedules for conducting any type of property 
transaction should be available online for public access. 
• Work towards an ASEAN portal for a consolidated database of the above 
information. 
Establishing a Uniform Land Titling System and Improving Governance
• Accelerate a systematic electronic land titling system.
• Put in place an efficient dispute resolution mechanism to resolve long running
land rights disputes.
• Set up a taskforce to study non-communal land rights and communal land
rights.
• Provide education and training for government officers in charge of issuing
land titles.
Clarifying Compulsory Acquisition Laws and Processes
• Clarify the meaning of key terms, and measures of compensation.
• Establish grievance procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms.
• Set up an ASEAN working group to study best practices on compulsory 
acquisition laws and processes. 
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Dispute Settlement Barriers 
 
Interim findings 
 
The research indicates that there is a general need to increase legal knowledge in 
certain areas of cross-border and international law (such as enforcement of arbitration 
awards under the New York Convention). 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
 
 
 
  
Judicial Connectivity
• Increase judicial dialogue at all levels of courts within ASEAN on international
law and cross-border enforcement matters.
• Wherever possible, publish commercial law judgments of ASEAN member
States’ highest appellate courts in English, with online access.
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Legal Information Barriers 
 
Interim findings 
 
While there are good online portals and databases being developed in ASEAN on 
trade and investment laws, there is a general need to improve the availability of 
information on the following. 
 
Preliminary Recommendations 
 
 
 
 
ASEAN Trade and Investment Laws Information
• Establish an up-to-date searchable database to cover the following.
• Status of ASEAN agreements and treaties.
• NTMs, and NTB reports and status of each case (building on the ATR and
Matrix of Actual Cases).
• TFA measures of member States, especially for AEOs and MSMEs.
• Investment Laws of member States.
• Infrastructure and PPP laws and policies.
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